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ABSTRACT 
 
SEC Confidential Treatment Orders:  Balancing Competing Regulatory Objectives. 
(August 2011) 
Anne Margaret Thompson, B.A., Harvard College; M.S., Boston College  
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Thomas C. Omer 
 
 This study examines how the Securities and Exchange Commission balances 
competing regulatory objectives in its decisions to approve requests to withhold 
proprietary information from firms’ financial reports.  The confidential treatment process 
requires the SEC to balance the public interest in protecting proprietary information with 
the public interest in promoting disclosures to investors.  I draw upon the economic and 
political science literatures on regulatory decision-making to test the strength of these 
interests on three aspects of the SEC’s decisions to grant confidential treatment: the 
duration of time required to approve the request, the duration of time the SEC agrees to 
protect proprietary information from disclosure, and whether the firm is successful in 
securing confidential treatment for all redacted information.  
I find that the public interest in promoting disclosure and protecting proprietary 
information influence different aspects of the SEC’s decisions to grant regulatory 
exemptions for confidential treatment.  Firms requiring greater monitoring by the SEC 
receive greater scrutiny and have lower odds of successful redaction.  High proprietary 
costs are associated with significantly longer protection periods but proprietary costs 
 iv 
generally are not associated with duration to approval or the success of the application.  
Finally, I find that the SEC applies greater scrutiny to firms exhibiting objective and 
salient measures of low financial reporting quality although these firms have higher odds 
of success.  These findings are consistent with the SEC reviewing CTRs to reduce the 
risk of legislative oversight. 
This study contributes to the literature on disclosure regulation by providing 
evidence as to how securities regulators balance competing interests when reviewing 
requests for disclosure exemptions. These findings also contribute to the role of political 
influence on disclosure policy, as the SEC’s exemption decisions are consistent with 
avoiding the threat of legislative oversight.   
 Second, these findings contribute to the literature on the SEC’s regulatory 
decisions by demonstrating that the SEC staff appears to allocate resources and apply 
scrutiny to applications for disclosure exemptions using aspects of registered firms’ 
financial reporting quality.  Third, these findings contribute to the literature on redaction 
as a disclosure choice by providing evidence suggesting that firms with low financial 
reporting quality are more likely to redact, and I provide evidence on the success of this 
disclosure choice.  Overall, these findings suggest that the public interest in promoting 
disclosure, as well as the threat of legislative oversight, influence the SEC’s decisions 
when granting regulatory exemptions to protect proprietary information. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study examines how the Securities and Exchange Commission balances 
competing regulatory objectives in its decisions to approve requests to withhold 
proprietary information from firms’ financial reports.  U.S. securities law provides SEC 
registrants with the opportunity to request confidential treatment for information that 
must otherwise be disclosed in regular SEC filings if the information is both proprietary 
and immaterial to investors.
1
  In reviewing these requests, the SEC weighs the public 
interest in protecting firms’ proprietary information with the public interest in promoting 
meaningful disclosures to investors.  Procedurally, firms request confidential treatment 
for proprietary information by filing required reports with the sensitive information 
redacted and providing the SEC with the complete disclosures and justification for the 
redaction.  The SEC may approve, deny, or request additional information about the 
confidential treatment request (CTR), and registrants may appeal unfavorable 
determinations.  Approved CTRs protect proprietary information from public disclosure 
for a period of time agreed upon by the registrant and the SEC.  While prior research has 
examined firms’ decisions to redact information from material contract filings 
(Verrecchia and Weber 2006) and institutions’ investment holdings (Agarwal et al. 
2009), the SEC’s decisions to approve CTRs remain unexplored.   
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of The Accounting Review. 
1 
Newman (1996, p.103) notes that the joint requirement that the information be commercially important 
but immaterial to investors represents “the inherent difficulty in applying for confidential treatment.”  
 2 
Investigating the SEC’s decisions in this context is important for three reasons.  
First, little evidence exists on how securities regulators implement disclosure policies 
(Leuz and Wysocki 2009) or balance competing interests in the regulatory process.  
Second, the conflict between competing public interests exposes the SEC to legislative 
intervention if Congress or its constituencies question the SEC’s discretionary decisions.  
Congress has, in the past, investigated the SEC for granting confidential treatment 
(Armstrong 1959) and recently restricted the SEC’s discretion to designate information 
as confidential under the Dodd-Frank Act (U.S. House of Representatives 2010).  In 
addition, recent press coverage surrounding AIG’s request to redact information from its 
Troubled Asset Relief Program contract was critical of the SEC although the 
commission denied AIG’s redactions of material information.  To reduce the risk of 
legislative intervention, the SEC may base CTR approval decisions on factors unrelated 
to the merits of the application, such as the firm’s financial reporting quality or incidence 
of noncompliance in prior periods.  Finally, firms may opportunistically request 
confidential treatment to avoid or delay disclosure of material information to investors 
(Agarwal et al. 2009). Therefore the SEC plays an important role in constraining this 
disclosure strategy.  
I examine the SEC’s balancing of the public interest in reducing the proprietary 
costs of disclosure against the public interest in promoting adequate financial statement 
disclosure using three aspects of CTR approval decisions.  I consider the duration of 
time between CTR request and approval (duration to approval) as a measure of the 
potential conflict between these competing interests following prior economic studies of 
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regulatory agency decision-making (Ando 1999; Sigman 2001; Kosnick 2005).  Second, 
I examine the duration of time over which the SEC agrees to protect proprietary 
information from public disclosure (the protection period).  Third, I examine whether the 
firm succeeds in securing confidential treatment, defining a successful request as SEC 
approval of a CTR in its entirety, without requiring un-redaction of some or all of the 
withheld information. 
I measure my primary public interest variables, the need to limit the costs of 
proprietary information disclosure and the need to promote adequate financial statement 
disclosure as follows:  I measure proprietary costs using industry concentration, barriers 
to entry, and industry profitability.  I expect that higher proprietary costs are associated 
with shorter duration to approval, longer protection periods, and higher odds of success.  
I measure the public interest in promoting adequate financial disclosure using the 
monitoring criteria set forth by Congress in Section 408 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.   
Section 408 directs the SEC to review registered firms’ financial reports at least once 
every three years, focusing monitoring efforts on firms with high price-to-earnings 
ratios, high market value of equity, high volatility, and previous restatements.  These 
criteria reflect the dimensions of financial reporting and disclosure that Congress views 
as requiring greater monitoring and posing greater risk to investors.  I expect that CTRs 
submitted by firms requiring greater monitoring under the Section 408 have longer 
duration to approval, shorter protection periods, and lower odds of success.
2
    
                                                 
2 
Because approved CTRs protect redacted information from public disclosure, the specific information 
redacted is not observable and I cannot design direct tests to evaluate the materiality of redacted 
information.  In un-tabulated analysis, I examine cumulative abnormal returns to firms and their product 
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In addition, the SEC faces political costs from legislative oversight when its 
discretionary decisions are questioned by the public or Congress.  Congress monitors the 
SEC using “fire-alarm” oversight, relying on the press and voting constituencies to 
notify the legislature when intervention is required (McCubbins 1985; Kinney 2005).
3
  It 
is easier and less costly for these parties to document evidence of regulatory failure than 
of regulatory success (Watts and Zimmerman 1986) and economic studies of other 
federal agencies, such as the FDA, conclude that these asymmetric costs distort 
regulators’ decisions (Peltzman 1973; Olson 1995).4  For these reasons, the SEC may 
apply greater scrutiny to or reject CTRs from firms with the most salient measures of 
low financial reporting quality because these measures impose the lowest cost on 
monitors.  I refer to objective and salient measures of low financial reporting quality as 
“red flags” due to the SEC’s usage of the term in AAERs and public statements as a 
signal to apply additional scrutiny to an item.  Due to their objectivity and salience to 
investors and the press, I classify restatements, internal control material weaknesses, and 
previous SEC investigations as red flags.  Thus, I also attempt to determine whether the 
                                                                                                                                                
market competitors surrounding un-redactions.  I find that firms incur significantly negative, albeit 
economically small, cumulative abnormal returns (-1, 1) surrounding un-redactions and that firms in the 
same four digit SIC code (an approximation of the firm’s closest product market competitors), earn 
positive significant cumulative abnormal returns over (-1, 1) surrounding un-redactions.  These findings 
are consistent with the SEC compelling disclosure of information that is material to a firm’s investors as 
well as useful to a firm’s competitors. 
3 
The alternative to fire-alarm oversight is “police-patrol” oversight, i.e. regular monitoring through audits 
of the agency and other procedures that produce regular information streams to congress.  Fire-alarm 
oversight is considered to be cost effective compared to the expense associated with regular monitoring 
(Lupia and McCubbins 1994).   
4 Several studies in the economics literature consider the FDA’s drug approval process.  The FDA has 
incentives not to approve drugs with observable side effects because the cost to documenting harm 
resulting from the side effects is lower than the cost of quantifying the loss incurred by those who did not 
benefit from drug approval.       
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SEC’s decisions to allocate resources to CTR review and to allow or deny a redaction 
are associated with these red flags. 
Using a sample of over 900 approved and 60 unapproved CTRs for material 
contracts filed in 2008 and 2009, I find that the public interests in promoting disclosure 
and protecting proprietary information, as well as the threat of legislative oversight, 
influence different aspects of CTR approval decisions.  I find that firms exhibiting red 
flags have significantly longer approval times but higher likelihood of successful 
redaction than other firms, possibly because they are less likely to request redaction of 
ineligible information. Proprietary costs influence the duration of time over which the 
SEC protects information from disclosure, but proprietary costs do not influence 
duration to approval or the success of the CTR application.  Finally, I find some 
evidence that firms requiring greater monitoring under SOX 408 have longer duration to 
approval and lower odds of success.  Overall, these findings suggest that the public 
interest in promoting disclosure, as well as the threat of legislative oversight, influence 
the SEC’s decisions when granting regulatory exemptions to protect proprietary 
information.   
In supplemental analysis, I examine proprietary costs and red flags as 
determinants of firms’ decisions to redact information from SEC filings. I find that firms 
exhibiting red flags have significantly higher odds of requesting confidential treatment.  
I also find that firms with higher proprietary costs are significantly more likely to redact, 
consistent with prior research (Verrecchia and Weber 2006).  Finally, I use this analysis 
to develop a selection model to control for selection bias in the SEC’s approval decisions 
 6 
and find consistent results when controlling for firms’ decisions to request confidential 
treatment.          
This study contributes to the literature on disclosure regulation by providing 
evidence on how the SEC balances competing public interests when evaluating requests 
for disclosure exemptions.  Little evidence exists on the process by which securities 
regulators implement disclosure regulations or on the role of political intervention in 
implementing disclosure regulations (Leuz and Wysocki 2009).  These findings provide 
evidence on both topics and suggest that the SEC implements disclosure exemption 
policies to avoid the legislative intervention.    
This study also contributes to the literature on the SEC’s regulatory decisions by 
demonstrating that the SEC staff appears use aspects of registrants’ financial reporting to 
allocate resources and apply scrutiny to CTRs.  These findings complement recent 
research using SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) and 
comment letters to examine the determinants and consequences of SEC staff decisions 
(Lei et al. 2010; Chen and Johnston 2010; Ertimur and Nondorf 2006; Files 2010; 
Correia 2009).  However, AAER and comment letter decisions are contingent on the 
registrant’s earnings quality and the SEC’s decisions to pursue investigations and 
reviews.  CTRs provide an opportunity to study the SEC’s resource allocations from a 
perspective other than the SEC’s selection decisions because registrants petition the staff 
for confidential treatment.  
Finally, this study contributes to the literature on redaction as a disclosure choice 
by examining the factors that influence the SEC’s decisions to approve CTRs and, 
 7 
correspondingly, the extent of resources firms devote to securing confidential treatment 
for their proprietary information.  Prior research finds that redacting firms have lower 
trading volume, smaller dollar depth, and a larger adverse selection component of the 
bid-ask spread (Verrecchia and Weber 2006), consistent with theoretical predictions 
linking greater disclosure to lower information asymmetry (e.g. Verrecchia 1983, 2001).   
In addition, redacting institutions and hedge funds are more likely to follow non-
standard investment strategies and redacted investment positions out-perform disclosed 
investment positions (Agarwal et al. 2009).  I find that firms with low financial reporting 
quality are significantly more likely to request CTRs but that their redactions are less 
likely to be ineligible or opportunistic.  In addition, I find that longer approval time for 
regulatory exemptions, and hence greater opportunity cost to management and higher 
legal fees, may be unintended consequences of poor financial reporting quality.  Finally, 
I extend Verrecchia and Weber’s (2006) findings on registrants’ propensity to redact 
information from material contract filings to a larger sample and provide evidence on the 
success of this disclosure choice.  
 8 
CHAPTER II 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Background Information on Confidential Treatment Requests for Material 
Contract Filings 
Firms’ contracts with outside parties often contain sensitive information that may 
be useful to competitors.  For example, price and quantity schedules in procurement 
contracts may be valuable to competitors in setting production levels.  The SEC requires 
firms to disclose entry into material definitive agreements that are not made in the 
ordinary course of business (hereafter “material contracts”) and publicly file the contract 
as an exhibit to an SEC filing.  Firms must disclose entry into material contracts on Form 
8-K filing within four days of contract execution, and may file the contract as an exhibit 
either to the 8-K or to the next periodic filing (SEC 2004).  
Most firms request CTRs under “the (b)(4) exemption” to The Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) (SEC 1997) which provides an exemption for “trade secrets and 
commercial or financial information, obtained from a person, and [that is] privileged and 
confidential.”  The exemption for proprietary information “encourages submitters to 
voluntarily furnish useful commercial or financial information to the government and it 
correspondingly provides the government with an assurance that such information will 
be reliable” (DOJ 2004).5  In this way, the FOIA exemption for proprietary information 
promotes the public interest by encouraging both innovation and greater information 
exchange between regulators and regulated firms.   
                                                 
5 
Prior to the FOIA (passed in 1966), the Administrative Procedures Act governed disclosure of 
information by federal agencies and the executive branch.
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Procedurally, firms file a redacted version of the contract as an exhibit to the 
mandatory filing in EDGAR and indicate that portions have been redacted pursuant to a 
request for confidential treatment.  Firms may not make overly broad redactions (SEC 
1997), may not redact required disclosures, and may not redact information investors 
would judge to be material.
6
  The firm also provides a complete copy of the contract to 
the SEC Staff with an analysis of the request for confidential treatment. The analysis 
must justify the eligibility of the information for confidential treatment under the FOIA, 
the competitive harm that would result from full disclosure, and the immateriality of the 
disclosures to investors.  In addition, the firm must specify the date until which the 
information is to remain confidential, the rationale for the confidential period, and 
consent to the release of confidential information for official purposes.   
The SEC expects to respond to CTRs within 28 days of receipt, either by 
approving the CTR and issuing a notice known as a “CT Order” or by sending a 
comment letter to the firm (SEC 2001; Newman 1996).  Firms must respond to comment 
letters within 21 days (SEC 2001).  By allowing firms to file redacted contracts pending 
CTR approval, the SEC provides confidential treatment to firms during the review 
period.  This structure imposes strong incentives on the SEC staff to review CTRs within 
the stated deadline (Newman 1996).   
The SEC may reject CTRs if the firm does not adequately justify its request.  In 
addition, the SEC will deny CTRs for procedural reasons, such as prior disclosure of 
                                                 
6 
The SEC lists the following as examples of required disclosures ineligible for redaction: interest expense, 
the identity of a 10% customer, the dollar amount of backlog orders, the duration and effect of intangibles, 
required disclosures in the MD&A, or related party transactions (SEC 1997).   
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redacted information even if the information was disclosed in error.  Finally, the SEC 
has discretion in reviewing CTRs.  “Rule 24b-2 merely provides a procedure for 
requesting confidential treatment; such treatment is not granted unless the information is 
exempt from disclosure under FOIA and under the Commission’s public interest 
concerns” (Comizio 1983).  Although firms must demonstrate that redacted information 
is eligible for confidential treatment, eligibility does not guarantee CTR approval.   
Theories of Regulatory Decision Making    
The United States Congress delegates substantial authority to independent federal 
agencies, such as the SEC, to regulate and promulgate rules and standards that are in the 
public interest (Fiorina 1982).  Congress retains substantial power over independent 
federal agencies in the form of budget appropriations, confirmation hearings for new 
commissioners, and convening investigations and hearings on agency affairs.  Congress 
“…holds the power of life or death in the most elemental terms throughout the existence 
of any agency.  The power to terminate, either by refusal to renew authorization or 
refusal to appropriate funds, is firmly lodged in Congress and nowhere else,” 
(McCubbins 1985, p. 728).   Posner (1974, pg 338) notes “Unlike business firms, 
government agencies must go to their capital markets – the legislative appropriations 
committees – each year.”  However, Congress rarely exercises its control over the 
bureaucracy and this stylized fact has generated considerable research as to why 
bureaucracies appear to operate with great discretion, why Congress appears to exercise 
little control, and what circumstances trigger significant congressional intervention.    
 11 
Two main theories explain regulatory agencies’ discretionary decisions and the 
general absence of legislative intervention: Congressional Dominance Theory and 
External Signals Theory.
7
  Congressional Dominance Theory (Weingast and Moran 
1983) uses principle-agent theory to propose that Congress controls Federal agencies 
through strong ex-ante incentives and the threat of ex-post sanctions.  In this setting, the 
appearance of regulatory discretion and the absence of legislative intervention both 
indicate an effective incentive structure and evidence that regulators generally 
implement the policy choices of Congress.  External Signals Theory (Joskow 1974; Noll 
1985) suggests that regulators have difficulty identifying and implementing actions that 
are in the public interest because the concept of the public interest is “elusive” (Noll 
1985).  Instead, regulators gauge their success in meeting the public interest based on 
positive and negative responses to their decisions.  Thus, regulators take actions that 
generate positive responses from outside groups and avoid taking actions that generate 
negative responses.  Both Congressional Dominance and External Signals theories 
predict that agencies seek to make decisions that are in the public interest and to avoid 
legislative intervention.   
The SEC has faced legislative intervention in the past due to its decisions to issue 
CTRs and, more generally, regulatory exemptions.  The House of Representatives 
Special Subcommittee on Government Information investigated the SEC in 1955 to 
                                                 
7 
Other theories that describe regulatory decision-making and discretion are the Traditional View and 
Captive Theory (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976).  The Traditional View holds that Congress cannot control 
the federal regulatory agencies.  Under this theory, agencies are not constrained to make decisions that 
align with the views of Congress.  However this position has largely been replaced with Congressional 
Dominance and External Signals.  Captive Theory is not applicable to this decision process because SEC 
registrants do not meet the theoretical conditions under which regulated firms can capture their regulator.   
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determine “…whether the Commission, dedicated to the essential task of requiring 
publication of pertinent information by corporations and brokers and dealers, was itself 
concealing information which might appropriately be made public,” (Armstrong 1959, p. 
806).  The SEC defended its practices, noting:  
“…there is a limited amount of information which cannot be made generally 
available for the public.  This includes information in the Commission’s files 
which Congress specifically provided should be kept confidential where 
disclosures would be contrary to the public interest as in the case of trade secrets 
and similar materials,” (SEC 1956, p.22).8     
  
In addition, the U.S. Senate Committee on Government Affairs investigated the SEC in 
2002 for granting to Enron a regulatory exemption from the Investment Company Act of 
1940 (US Senate 2002).  
More recently, the House Committee on Governmental Oversight and Reform 
held a hearing in January 2010 on AIG’s “bailout,” including AIG’s public disclosures 
surrounding its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) contract with the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York.  The SEC required AIG to disclose its TARP contract to 
investors as a material contract and AIG requested confidential treatment for the entirety 
of Schedule A detailing the controversial “backdoor bailout” of sixteen financial 
institutions that had purchased credit default swaps from AIG.  AIG and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York argued that Schedule A must remain confidential to avoid 
price declines that would limit the Federal Reserve’s ability to sell the securities.9  The 
SEC judged the identity of and payments to the sixteen financial institutions to be 
                                                 
8 
This report footnotes the applicable sections of securities law under which the Commission grants 
confidential treatment, specifically Section 24b of the 1934 Act under which most CTRs are granted. 
9 
The committee’s document production is archived http://documents.republicans.oversight.house.gov/ 
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material to AIG’s investors and therefore ineligible for redaction.  AIG re-filed an 
amended Schedule A three times, each with fewer redactions, before the SEC approved 
redaction of the individual Cusips in May 2009.  Although the SEC disallowed redaction 
of material information, the press coverage surrounding AIG’s disclosures suggested that 
the SEC aided AIG and the Federal Reserve in concealing information from Congress 
and American taxpayers.  The press acts as an important monitor on behalf of Congress 
and public criticism of the SEC’s discretionary regulatory decisions raises the risk of 
oversight.  In response to this hearing, the SEC’s Office of the Inspector General 
initiated an audit of the confidential treatment process.   
Finally, Congress amended the Dodd-Frank Act in September 2010 to restrict the 
SEC’s discretion to designate information obtained during examinations and 
investigations as confidential.
10
  The House Committee on Governmental Oversight and 
Reform Chair Edolphus Towns sponsored the amendment, citing concerns surrounding 
the SEC’s “willingness to exploit the secrecy provisions” afforded to the agency in the 
Act (Towns 2010).  This recent example of Congressional intervention underscores the 
tension between Congress and SEC surrounding confidential treatment of company 
information.  
Hypotheses 
The SEC requires mandatory disclosures as a remedy to past market failures with 
the expectation that better informed investors lead both to more efficient prices and to 
                                                 
10 
Confidential treatment for information obtained through examinations and investigations is considered 
to be information not voluntarily furnished to a regulator and falls under a different FOIA exemption than 
routine EDGAR filings such material contracts.   
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increased difficulty in perpetrating fraud and other stock price manipulation (Phillips and 
Zechner 1981).  In these ways, mandatory disclosure is in the public interest by 
protecting investors and promoting capital formation has existed since the SEC’s 
founding and persists through today.  However, withholding proprietary and 
commercially sensitive information from public disclosure, as provided for by Congress 
in the FOIA exemption, also promotes the public interest.  Although theory suggests that 
the SEC will balance competing public interests to avoid legislative oversight, how the 
SEC weights the public interests of promoting adequate disclosure and reducing 
proprietary costs to disclosure ultimately is an empirical question.  Accordingly, I draw 
upon economic studies of regulatory agency decision-making to investigate this 
weighting in the CTR approval process.   
Duration to Approval 
 The first hypothesis examines the duration of time between CTR request and 
approval.  Duration to approval, or regulatory delay, reflects the net cost/benefit tradeoff 
among competing interests in a regulatory setting (Kosnick 2005).  Many economic 
studies base conclusions concerning the strength and incentives of competing interests 
on their influence over regulatory delay (Ando 1999; Sigman 2001; Carpenter 2002; 
Kosnick 2005).  Fish and Wildlife Service’s decisions to approve listing under the 
Endangered Species Act are accelerated (delayed) based on public support (opposition) 
(Ando 1999).  The Environmental Protection Agency’s priorities for Superfund 
remediation reflect competing incentives; the marginal effect of higher income and 
voter-turnout in affected communities accelerates clean-up and the existence of liable 
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parties who bear costs of remediation are associated with lower priority (Sigman 2001).  
Interest groups and media coverage of medical conditions influence the Food and Drug 
Administration’s new pharmaceuticals approval (Carpenter 2002).  However, the FDA 
also has discretion to approve “important” drugs more quickly (Dranove and Meltzer 
1994) and may be influenced by firm specific characteristics such as domestic versus 
foreign ownership, R&D intensity, and diversification (Olson 1997).  Finally, Kosnick 
(2005) finds that all interested parties to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s 
hydroelectric dam re-licensing process may prefer longer delay.   
In addition, recent studies of the SEC’s comment letter process measure the 
severity of disagreement between managers and the SEC using duration of time required 
to resolve a comment letter (Chen and Johnston 2010; Ertimur and Nondorf 2006).  IPO 
firms whose CFOs have prior public company experience have shorter comment letter 
periods (Ertimur and Nondorf 2006), indicating less disagreement between the firm and 
the SEC concerning the quality of financial reporting.  In addition, firms with the longest 
comment letter periods experience the greatest improvement in information environment 
following resolution of the comment letter (Chen and Johnston 2010).   
Following prior research, I expect the duration to approval for CTRs to reflect 
the SEC’s weighting of competing interests.  Regarding the public interest in promoting 
adequate disclosure to investors, redaction increases information asymmetry (Verrecchia 
1983, 2001; Verrecchia and Weber 2006) and Lev (1988 p.3) notes that “inequity in 
capital markets resulting from information asymmetry can and does occur, and that its 
social consequences in the form of high transaction costs, thin markets, low liquidity 
 16 
and, in general-decreased gains from trade, are indeed very undesirable.”  I measure the 
public interest in promoting disclosure using criteria set forth by Congress in Section 
408 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act.  SOX Section 408 requires the SEC to increase 
monitoring of registered firms’ financial reports and to review each firm’s financial 
reports at least once every three years.  Section 408 specifies the aspects of financial 
reporting and disclosure that Congress views as requiring greater monitoring by the SEC 
due to the risk posed by these firms to investors.    
I expect that an increase in information asymmetry due to redaction is less 
desirable from a policy standpoint among firms posing greater risk to investors and that 
the SEC will apply greater scrutiny to CTRs from such firms.  Accordingly, I expect 
firms requiring greater monitoring under SOX 408 have significantly longer duration to 
approval.   
Hypothesis 1a:  CTRs from firms requiring greater monitoring under SOX 408 
exhibit longer duration to approval     
Regarding the public interest in reducing proprietary costs to disclosure, firms 
with high proprietary costs may make stronger cases for eligibility, leading to faster 
approval for firms with high proprietary costs.  However, the implications for firms with 
low proprietary costs are unclear.  The SEC may reject CTRs quickly when firms cannot 
meet the eligibility criteria for confidential treatment.  Alternately, the SEC may allow 
the firms that submit weak applications to provide additional documentation, increasing 
the duration to approval.  Thus, I make no sign prediction for the role of proprietary 
costs on duration to approval, as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1b:  Proprietary costs are associated with CTR duration to approval 
  
Protection Period Approved by the SEC 
 The second set of hypotheses examine the duration of time over which the SEC 
agrees to protect proprietary information from public disclosure (the protection period).  
I expect that the protection period reflects the strength of a firm’s claims of competitive 
harm because the SEC is “generally more amenable to claims for a longer period when 
the applicant’s arguments regarding competitive harm have strong merit,” (Newman 
1996, paragraph 21).  The SEC does not approve redaction periods beyond the life of the 
contract (SEC 2001) and prefers to grant confidential treatment for shorter time periods.  
Further, the SEC encourages firms seeking longer confidential treatment periods to 
apply for extensions to the original CTR rather than granting confidential treatment for 
long time periods (Newman 2001).  For these reasons, I expect that strong claims of 
proprietary costs are associated with longer redaction periods.  In addition, I expect that 
the SEC may grant shorter protection periods to firms that pose greater financial 
reporting risk to investors.     
Hypothesis 2a:  CTRs from firms requiring greater monitoring under SOX 408 
receive shorter protection periods 
Hypothesis 2b:  High proprietary costs are associated with longer protection 
periods 
Outcome of the CTR Decision  
 The third set of hypotheses examines the success of CTR applications, i.e., the 
probability that the SEC does not reject redactions of some or all of the withheld 
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information.  The SEC may reject CTRs that do not meet the criteria for confidential 
treatment, either because the information is not proprietary or because the information is 
material to investors.  In addition, the SEC may exercise discretion in approving CTRs 
even if the CTR meets the eligibility criteria.   
Prior research finds that regulators have incentives to reject applications that pose 
potential political costs in the future due to the asymmetric cost of documenting 
regulatory failure relative to regulatory successes (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  In the 
case of the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) approval of new drug applications, 
the side-effects of a drug approved for use are observable and measurable whereas the 
loss incurred by those who would have benefitted from a rejected application are neither 
observable nor easily quantified (Peltzman 1973; Olson 1995).  As a result, the FDA 
may reject drugs with observable side-effects because these drugs pose a higher risk of 
political costs and legislative intervention in the future.  Because prior studies of Federal 
agencies find that regulators are sensitive to the threat of legislative intervention and 
may reject applications that pose high political costs, I expect that the SEC is sensitive to 
the threat of legislative intervention and may reject applications that pose political costs.   
Hypothesis 3a:  Firms requiring greater monitoring under SOX 408 have lower 
odds of success 
Hypothesis 3b:  Low proprietary costs are associated with lower odds of success 
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Red Flags 
 A common theme in Congressional hearings and reports critical of the SEC is 
that the SEC failed to act on warning signs of financial reporting failures or “red flags.”  
The Chairman of the House Operations Subcommittee on Commerce accused the SEC 
of ignoring red flags following the 1985 collapse of Bevill, Bresler, and Schulman Asset 
Management, an unregulated government securities dealer.  The SEC had not 
investigated recent allegations of misconduct at the firm because the alleged 
improprieties were less severe than previous infractions that resulted in an SEC 
investigation and sanction (NYT 1985).  More recent examples of the SEC’s failure to 
heed “red flags” include the revelations that the SEC was aware of the substantial risk 
posed by Bear Stearns to the market as early as 2005 (SEC 2009) and that the SEC had 
received several “substantial” tips that Bernard Madoff operated a Ponzi scheme as early 
as 1991 (SEC 2008).  In addition, the SEC frequently cites red flags when discussing its 
decisions to sanction auditors, practitioners, and firms in the enforcement process.  The 
SEC included the term “red flag” in 84 separate AAERs issued between 2000 and 2010.   
 Congress monitors the regulatory agencies using “fire-alarm” oversight 
(McCubbins 1985; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984), relying on the public to identify 
divergence from the public interest and alert Congress to intervene.  Because the public 
can most easily identify objective and salient instances of financial reporting failures, I 
expect that the SEC responds to these incentives by applying additional scrutiny to firms 
with red flags, protecting confidential treatment for shorter time periods, or by rejecting 
applications from firms with red flags due to the higher risk of future political costs due 
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to legislative intervention.  Accordingly, I set forth the following hypotheses, stated in 
the alternative form: 
 Hypothesis 4a:  Red flags are associated with longer duration to approval 
 Hypothesis 4b:  Red flags are associated with shorter protection periods 
Hypothesis 4c:  Red Flags are associated with lower odds of success 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Sample Selection 
 My sample consists of all CTRs approved between May 1, 2008 and November 
30, 2009.  Prior to May 1, 2008, the SEC did not publically disclose CTR approvals, 
therefore CTRs approved prior to this date are not observable.  Each approved CTR 
specifies the date and form type of the initial filing in which the CTR was requested, 
whether the CTR is a new request or a request to extend a prior CTR, the exhibits that 
contain approved redactions, the period over which the redactions will remain 
confidential, and whether the initial filing was amended or amended to include un-
redactions. Refer to Appendix B for an example of a partially-approved CTR.   
I construct several variables from this data.  First, MONTHS_TO_APPROVAL 
equals the days between the initial filing date and the approval date divided by 30 and 
rounded up to the nearest month.  PROTECTION_PERIOD equals the length of time 
that the SEC approves confidential treatment of the redacted information measured in 
years.  SUCCESS is an indicator variable equal to one if the registrant did not un-redact 
information or amend the initial CTR and is equal to zero otherwise.  EXHIBIT_COUNT 
equals the number of exhibits listed as redacted on the CT Order.  FORM_8K is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the material contract was filed in an 8-K or 6-K filing 
and equal to zero otherwise.  FOREIGN_FILER is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the firm is a foreign registrant and equals zero otherwise.  The main sample used to test 
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the SEC’s approval decisions consists of 940 approved CTRs issued between 5/1/08 and 
11/30/09 with available data for all tests. 
Duration of Time to CTR Approval 
 Prior studies examine regulators’ weighing of competing public interests using 
the coefficients of the competing interests in regressions on duration to approval 
(Kosnick 2005; Ando 1999; Olson 1997; Sigman 2001).  I follow this methodology and 
examine the duration of time required to approve a CTR to examine the weighting of the 
public interest in promoting disclosure, the public interest in protecting proprietary 
information, and the role of red flags on duration to approval.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
sequence of events for this test. 
Staff Legal Bulletin No. 1 notes that the SEC aims to review and either approve 
or return comments to the registrants within 28 days (SEC 2001).  If the CTR is not 
approved, the registrant must respond within 21 days.  Based on this time-frame, I 
measure duration of time to approval in number of months, a count variable.
11
  
MONTHS_TO_APPROVAL is over-dispersed as a dependent variable (mean=1.371, 
variance=3.065), which may bias downward standard errors in a Poisson regression 
(Long and Freese 2006).  Instead, I use a negative binomial regression which fits a 
                                                 
11 This guideline applies unless the CTR is requested in conjunction with a registration statement.  
Registration statements comprise three percent of the sample.  Excluding registrations has no effect on the 
inferences. 
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FIGURE 1 
Sequence of events in the duration analysis 
Model 1: Negative Binomial Regression 
(2008 and 2009 approvals) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 4: Hazard Model 
(2008 requests only) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5/1/2008 12/31/2008 11/30/2009 
CTR approval decision 
observable 
Firm requests CTR 
SEC approves CTR 
 
 
5/1/2008 12/31/2008 11/30/2009 
Firm Requests CTR 
SEC approves CTR or firm 
is right-censored 
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Poisson regression with an additional error term for unobserved heterogeneity to correct 
the downward bias in the standard errors.  The independent variables in this regression 
are the SOX 408 measures (H1a), proprietary costs (H1b), red flags (H4a), and CTR and 
firm controls.  I estimate Model 1 as follows: 
 MONTHS_TO_APPROVALi=exp(α + β1-3Section 408n + β4-9Proprietary Costsn +
    β10-12Red Flagsn + β13-20Firm and CTR Controlsn)δi  
In addition to these variables, I include indicator variables for year and fiscal quarter to 
control for agency budget and workload.  I cluster the standard errors by firm to control 
for time-series correlation.   
Length of the Protection Period 
 The second SEC decision I study is the duration of time over which the SEC 
agrees to protect proprietary information from disclosure.  PROTECTION_PERIOD 
equals the number of years between the CTR request date and the date through which the 
SEC agrees to confidential treatment, rounded to the nearest year.  The variable 
PROTECTION_PERIOD is a count variable and is over-dispersed (mean=5.173, 
variance=11.406), therefore I use a negative binomial regression to model this decision.  
The independent variables in this regression are the SOX 408 measures (H2a), 
proprietary costs (H2b), red flags (H4b), and CTR and firm controls.  Similar to Model 
1, I also include indicator variables for year and fiscal quarter to control for agency 
budget and workload and cluster standard errors by firm.  I estimate Model 2 as follows: 
PROTECTION_PERIODi=exp(α + β1-3Section 408n + β4-9Proprietary Costsn +
    β10-12Red Flagsn + β13-20Firm and CTR Controlsn)δi 
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Probability of Successful Redaction  
Third, I examine the probability that the SEC will approve the CTR without 
requiring un-redaction of some or all redacted information.  I identify un-redactions and 
partial un-redactions from two sources.  First, approved CTRs state whether the 
registrant amended or un-redacted information prior to approval (a partial un-redaction).  
Second, I search amended SEC filings for evidence of un-redactions or withdrawn CTRs 
using keywords “confidential treatment” or “redact” in the explanatory section.  I 
combine these two searches into an indicator variable equal to one if the firm receives 
approval with no un-redaction and equal to zero if the firm amended or un-redacted 
information (SUCCESS).  I use a logistic regression to examine the odds of a firm 
receiving CTR approval without revision (Model 3) as follows: 
Pr(SUCCESS=1)i=exp(α + β1-3Section 408n + β4-9Proprietary Costsn + 
  β10-12Red Flagsn + β13-20Firm and CTR Controlsn) 
This model includes indicator variables for year and quarter to control for agency budget 
and workload.  Standard errors are clustered by firm to control for time-series 
correlation.   
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SOX Section 408 Measures 
I measure the public interest in promoting adequate disclosure using the SOX 
Section 408 monitoring criteria.  The Act specifies that, among other unspecified factors,  
the SEC should consider  
“(1) issuers that have issued material restatements of financial results; (2) issuers 
that experience significant volatility in their stock price as compared to other 
issuers; (3) issuers with the largest market capitalization; (4) emerging 
companies with disparities in the price to earnings ratio; (5) issuers whose 
operations significantly affect any material sector of the economy; and (6) any 
other factors the Commission may consider relevant.”  
 
RESTATEMENT is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm reported a non-
technical financial restatement between 2004 and 2007 per Audit Analytics or keyword 
search of firms’ filings for firms without Audit Analytics coverage.12  In addition, 
restatements are objectively determined and easily observable to the public through 
either press releases or review of SEC filings, thus restatements are also classified as a 
Red Flag.
13
  I measure volatility using the firm’s beta calculated over the period (-300,    
-45) prior to the CTR request date and construct an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm’s beta exceeded 1.5 (HIGH_VOLATILITY).14  I measure firms with high market 
value of equity as an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s market value of equity 
as of the 2007 balance sheet date is in the highest decile of firms with available data on 
Compustat and equal to zero otherwise (HIGH_MVE).  I measure the P/E Ratio as year-
                                                 
12 
Audit Analytics includes only restatements due to non-GAAP financial reporting and excludes 
restatements due to changes in accounting principles and adoption of new accounting standards.    
13 
In supplemental tests, I vary the measurement window on prior restatements and material weaknesses.   
14 
Value Line considers a beta greater than 1.5 to be high. In supplemental analysis, HIGH_VOLATILITY 
equals one if firm beta is in the highest decile within sample (beta>=1.88).  This measure of volatility has 
a negative and significant coefficient for DURATION_TO_APPROVAL, but inferences for other tests are 
consistent with tabulated results.  
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end closing price per share divided by earnings per share as of the 2007 balance sheet 
date (PE_RATIO).  I do not operationalize criteria (5) for issuers whose operations 
significantly affect any material sector of the economy due to ambiguity in defining the 
underlying construct and concerns regarding co-linearity with HIGH_MVE and industry 
concentration.  Hereafter, the term “firms requiring greater monitoring under SOX 408” 
refers to firms with higher P/E Ratios, HIGH_MVE equal to one, HIGH_VOLATILITY 
equal to one, and/or RESTATEMENT equal to one.       
Proprietary Costs  
I measure proprietary costs using barriers to entry, industry concentration, and 
profitability (X. Li 2010), and reported operating segments (Harris 1998; Leuz 2004).  I 
control for barriers to entry using industry investment in fixed assets and firm and 
industry investment in research and development (X. Li 2010).  Both fixed assets and 
R&D impose barriers to entry in an industry by requiring greater initial investment.  
Thus, firms in capital and R&D intensive industries may face a lower threat of new 
entry.  Firm research and development expense (RD) equals total research and 
development expense scaled by total assets.  Industry R&D intensity (IND_RD) equals 
mean research and development expense scaled by total assets as of the 2007 balance 
sheet date for all firms in the same two digit SIC code as of the 2007 balance sheet date.  
I set RD and IND_RD equal to zero for firms that do not report research and 
development expense.  Industry capital expenditures (IND_CAPX) equal mean capital 
expenditures for all firms in the same two digit SIC code as of the 2007 balance sheet 
date.  I control for industry profitability (IND_ROA) using industry mean ROA as of the 
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2007 balance sheet date. Finally, I include the log number of operating segments per 
Compustat Segment (SEGMENTS) to control for diversification and the effect of 
proprietary costs on segment reporting.
15
   
 I control for industry concentration using the natural log of the number of firms 
per NAICS industry as reported by the 2007 Economic Census (LOG_FIRMS).  Ali et al. 
(2009) find that measuring industry concentration using Hirfindahl indices constructed 
from Compustat data may lead to incorrect inferences concerning the role of industry 
concentration on firm’s disclosure choices.  Instead, they recommend using industry 
concentration measures published by the U.S. Census Department.  I do not use Census 
industry concentration measures because Census provides industry concentration 
measures only for manufacturing firms and a substantial proportion of my sample 
consists of firms in non-manufacturing industries.  Refer to Appendix A for validation of 
LOG_FIRMS as an inverse measure of industry concentration. 
Red Flags     
In addition to RESTATEMENT, I include two additional measures of red flags.  
SEC_INVESTIG equals one if the SEC has investigated the firm for a restatement since 
2004 per Audit Analytics.  Investigations reflect restatement severity because the SEC 
chose to allocate resources to these financial reporting misstatements.  This variable also 
separates severe from non-severe restatements due to the growth in reported restatements 
in recent years (Scholz 2008).  
                                                 
15 
I measure proprietary costs at the firm level using the industry code assigned to the firm in Compustat 
Fundamentals Annual or Quarterly databases.  I do not measure proprietary costs at the operating segment 
level for multi-segment firms due to difficulty matching the material contract filing to the correct 
operating segment. 
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Finally, ICMW is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm reported an 
internal control material weakness under Section 404 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act between 
2004 and 2007 per Audit Analytics or through keyword searches of firms without 
coverage in Audit Analytics.  A material weakness is the most severe category of control 
weakness and is defined as “a significant deficiency or combination of significant 
deficiencies that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of 
the annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected,” (PCAOB 
2004).   Material weaknesses may signal the potential for financial reporting problems in 
the future, and Doyle et al. (2007) find an increased incidence of restatements among 
firms disclosing material weaknesses.  Section 404 material weaknesses are objectively 
determined and publicly observable because they are disclosed in the financial 
statements and result in an adverse audit opinion.  Thus, ICMW is classified as a red flag.  
Firm Characteristics 
I include controls for variation in firm-specific characteristics.  If the firm files a 
CTR in a quarterly or annual filing, all accounting variables are measured as of that 
filing.  If the firm files a CTR associated with an 8-K filing, I measure accounting 
variables as of the previous quarter because this is the most recent accounting 
information available to the SEC when the CTR is received.  I control for firm size using 
the natural log of total assets (LOG_ASSETS).  I control for firm performance using 
return on assets (ROA), and an indicator variable equal to one if the firm reports negative 
cash flow from operations and equal to zero otherwise (NEG_CF).  I include leverage 
equal to total debt divided by total assets (DEBT_RATIO) to control for the information 
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needs of both debt holders and investors who share claims on the firm with debt holders.  
To control for the quality of firms’ external advisors and professionals, I include an 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm is audited by a Big 4 firms, and equal to zero 
otherwise (BIGN).  Finally, to control for the extent of information search by outsiders, I 
include an indicator variable equal to one if any analysts followed the firm in 2008 per 
I/B/E/S and equal to zero otherwise (FOLLOWING). 
16
 
                                                 
16 
I also consider the role of corporate governance if the extent of monitoring by outsiders influences the 
SEC’s decisions to approve CTRs.  Including corporate governance data from Board Analyst reduces the 
full sample to 607 observations and the 2008 sample to 267 observations.   I include the percentage 
ownership by 5% block holders and indicator variables equal to one for firms with an independent audit 
committee and majority institutional ownership.  These variables are not significant in the negative 
binomial regression although the percentage ownership by 5% block holders is positively associated with 
the odds of success (p<0.05).  The inferences concerning other variables are generally consistent when 
controlling for these measures.   
 31 
CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1, Panel A presents the sample selection and composition for the full 
population of approved CTRs and the sample of CTRs requested between 5/1/08 and 
12/31/08.  First, I identify 2,378 CT Order filings on EDGAR posted between 5/1/08 and 
11/30/09.  I exclude 419 extensions of previously approved CTRs, leaving a sample of 
1,959 CTRs approved during this period.  Of these, 33 CTRs were requested in 2005 or 
prior years and 58 were requested in 2006, indicating that these firms had relatively long 
duration to approval.  In addition, 141 CTRs were requested in 2007 and not approved 
until at least 5/1/08.  Finally, 988 CTRs were requested and approved in 2008 and 739 
were requested and approved in 2009.  The sample of CTRs requested between 5/1/08 
and 11/30/09 consists of 939 approved CTRs for firms with available data in Compustat 
and CRSP to calculate all measures.   
 Table 1, Panel B presents descriptive evidence on the characteristics of approved 
CTRs and extensions during the sample period regardless of archival data availability.  
Of the new CTRs approved, 89 percent were approved without amendment or un-
redaction.  The mean number of exhibits redacted equals 1.8.  77 percent of CTRs were 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics on confidential treatment requests  
 
Panel A:  Sample reconciliation  
 
Approved CTRs filed on Edgar 5/1/08 - 11/30/09 
 
  Approved CTRs  2,378 
 Less: Approved extensions of older CT Orders  -419 
 Total New CT Orders   1,959 
 
 
 
  CT Orders requested in 2005 and prior  33 
 CT Orders requested in 2006  58 
 CT Orders requested in 2007  141 
 CT Orders requested in 2008  988 
 CT Orders requested in 2009  739 
 
 
 1,959 
 
 
 
  
New CTRs requested 5/1/08 - 12/31/08 
 
  Approved by 11/30/09  745 
 Less:  Firms missing Compustat data  -166 
 Subtotal:  Approved 2008 sample  579 
 
 
 
  Requested 5/1/08-12/31/08 but not approved by 11/30/09  64 
 Total 2008 Sample  645 
  
 
Panel B:  Descriptive Statistics on CTRs approved 5/1/08-11/30/09 
 
 
 New CT Orders (n=1,959) Extensions Approved (n=419) 
   Mean  Count 
 
Mean  Count 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 SUCCESS  0.898  1,759  
0.836  350 
EXHIBIT_COUNT  1.811  3,547  
1.470  616 
Periodic Filing  0.766  1,501  
0.603  253 
Amended Filing  0.016  32  
0.014  6 
FORM_8K   0.187  366  
0.105  44 
FOREIGN_FILER  0.056  109  
0.064  27 
Registration Statement  0.037  72  
0.251  105 
Small (10KSB) filer   0.014  28  
0.019  8 
PROTECTION_PERIOD  3.949  n/a  
5.13  n/a 
 
 
 
 (continued on next page) 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Panel C:  Duration to approval and protection period for CTRs with all available data 
approved 5/1/08-11/30/09 
 
 
Obs Mean Std Dev 25% 50% 75% 95% 
MONTHS_TO_APPROVAL 1,004 1.376 1.746 0 1 2 5 
PROTECTION_PERIOD 1,004 5.255 3.405 3 5 9 10 
 
Panel D:  Industry distribution of CTR firms approved 5/1/08-11/30/09 with available data 
to determine industry membership 
 
Industry 
 
New CT Orders 
 
Extensions 
Agriculture  0%  0% 
Mining  1%  0% 
Food  1%  1% 
Textiles  2%  0% 
Chemical  3%  2% 
Pharmaceuticals  27%  40% 
Extractive   1%  0% 
Manufacturing  16%  19% 
Transportation  10%  9% 
Utilities  3%  0% 
Retail  5%  6% 
Services  9%  6% 
Computers  17%  15% 
Banking and Insurance  6%  2% 
Totals  100%  100% 
Observations  1,376  241 
  
 
 
 
 
 
requested for material contracts filed on a periodic filing, 19 percent were requested on 
8-K filings, and 6 percent were requested in conjunction with registration statements.  In 
addition, 4 percent of firms receiving approved CTRs are foreign registrants and 1.4 
percent are small filers.   
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 Table 1, Panel C presents the duration of time required to approve a CTR in 
months.  Mean MONTHS_TO_APPROVAL equals 1.37 months.  The median 
MONTHS_TO_APPROVAL is 1 month, the 75th percentile equals 2 months, and the 
95th percentile equals 5 months.   These figures indicate that the majority of CTRs are 
approved within 2 months of submission.  The mean PROTECTION_PERIOD equals 
5.25 years, with a median of 5 years, 75th percentile of 9 years, and 95th percentile of 10 
years, indicating significant variation in the length of the protection period.  Table 1, 
Panel D presents the industry distribution of CTRs for firms with industry data in 
Compustat.  Pharmaceuticals firms comprise the highest industry representation in the 
sample with 27 percent of approved CTRs, followed by Computers (17 percent), 
Manufacturing (16 percent), Transportation (10 percent), and Services (9 percent).  All 
other industries comprise 5 percent or less of the sample.   
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for SOX 408 measures, proprietary costs, 
red flags, and CTR and firm characteristics.   Mean PE_RATIO for firms in the sample 
equals -0.216, consistent with many firms in the sample reporting losses in 2007.  Six 
percent of firms in the sample are in the highest decile of market value of equity 
(HIGH_MVE), and 25 percent of firms are categorized as HIGH_VOLATILITY.  The 
mean Hirfindahl Index based on two digit SIC code equals 468, indicating that many 
firms operate in competitive industries.
17
  In addition, LOG_FIRMS equals 7.21 and the 
mean number of operating segments (SEGMENTS) equals 3.63 (log equal to 1.025).   
Finally, industry mean research and development expense (IND_RD)  
                                                 
17 
The Department of Justice merger guidelines list a Hirfindahl Index of 1000 as the threshold for review 
in horizontal mergers. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean StdDev 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
Dependent Variables 
       MONTHS_TO_APPROVAL 1.364 1.744 0.000 0.000 1.000 2.000 5.000 
PROTECTION_PERIOD 5.480 3.211 0.784 2.745 4.899 9.430 9.932 
SUCCESS 0.928 0.259 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
        Section 408 Measures 
       PE_RATIO -0.216 8.349 -2.240 -0.269 -0.044 0.391 2.861 
HIGH_MVE 0.063 0.243 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
HIGH_VOLATILITY 0.245 0.430 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
        Proprietary Costs 
       H-INDEX  467.994 383.207 186.566 261.871 340.415 480.555 1278.7 
LOG_FIRMS 7.213 1.482 5.193 6.260 6.860 8.171 10.042 
RD -0.216 2.069 -2.615 -0.747 0.000 0.000 2.775 
SEGMENTS 1.025 0.746 0.000 0.000 1.099 1.609 2.079 
IND_RD 0.231 0.224 0.000 0.029 0.166 0.391 0.678 
IND_CAPX 0.045 0.031 0.022 0.028 0.033 0.058 0.095 
IND_ROA -1.033 3.639 -1.887 -0.956 -0.686 -0.056 0.082 
        Red Flags 
       SEC_INVESTIG 0.087 0.282 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
RESTATEMENT 0.319 0.467 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ICMW 0.180 0.384 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
        Firm Characteristics 
       ROA -0.085 0.243 -0.409 -0.096 -0.012 0.011 0.052 
DEBT_RATIO 0.249 0.422 0.000 0.000 0.112 0.353 0.833 
NEG_CF 0.502 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BIGN 0.732 0.443 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
FORM_8K 0.159 0.366 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
FOREIGN_FILER 0.029 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EXHIBIT_COUNT 1.711 1.452 1.000 1.000 1.000 2.000 5.000 
FOLLOWING 0.656 0.475 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Observations with available data equal 939 except for HIGH_VOLATILITY (n=875) 
Refer to Appendix C for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 3 
 
Negative binomial regression of the determinants of duration to CTR approval 
 
(continued on next page) 
 
 
 
 Predicted 
Sign 
 MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
 MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
Section 408 Measures      
PE_RATIO   +  0.018***  0.021*** 
    (2.469)  (2.419) 
HIGH_MVE  +  -0.267#  -0.265# 
    (-1.901)  (-1.857) 
HIGH_VOLATILITY  +    -0.132 
      (-1.231) 
Proprietary Costs       
RD  -  -0.004  -0.009 
    (-0.196)  (-0.419) 
LOG_FIRMS  +  0.047  0.044 
    (1.270)  (1.092) 
SEGMENTS  +/-  -0.054  -0.030 
    (-0.793)  (-0.410) 
IND_ROA  -  0.009  0.007 
    (1.058)  (0.783) 
IND_RD  -  0.080  0.085 
    (0.353)  (0.354) 
IND_CAPX  -  -0.959  -0.952 
    (-0.678)  (-0.661) 
Red Flags       
RESTATEMENT  +  -0.080  -0.091 
    (-0.658)  (-0.712) 
ICMW  +  0.223**  0.263** 
    (1.775)  (2.054) 
SEC_INVESTIG  +  0.359**  0.380** 
    (2.143)  (2.151) 
Firm Characteristics   
FOREIGN_FILER  0.053 0.115 
  (0.242) (0.491) 
FORM_8-K  0.095 0.064 
  (0.833) (0.507) 
ROA  0.281* 0.368 
  (1.654) (1.521) 
DEBT_RATIO  0.112 0.055 
  (1.163) (0.495) 
NEG_CFO  -0.095 -0.057 
  (-0.978) (-0.558) 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 based on two tailed tests unless indicated by a sign prediction.  
Standard errors are clustered by firm.   
Models include year and quarter indicators.  
See Appendix C for variable definitions.  
 
 
 
 
equals -0.21, industry mean capital expenditures (IND_CAPX) equal 0.05, and industry 
mean ROA (IND_ROA) equals -1.033.   Eight percent of CTRs are filed by firms that 
have been investigated the SEC, 31 percent are filed by firms that have reported a 
restatement in prior years, and 18 percent are filed by firms that have reported material 
weaknesses.  Mean debt ratio equals 0.25 and 50 percent of firms reported negative 
operating cash flows (NEG_CF), consistent with the adverse economic conditions 
present in 2008 and 2009.  Finally 73 percent of firms retain a Big N auditor, indicating 
that the majority of firms requesting CTRs invest in high quality external professional 
services. 
 
 
 
Predicted 
Sign 
 MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
 MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
BIGN   0.144  0.176 
   (1.357)  (1.564) 
FOLLOWING   -0.110  -0.051 
   (-1.116)  (-0.485) 
EXHIBIT_COUNT   0.028  0.023 
   (1.341)  (1.052) 
Constant   0.190  0.170 
   (0.496)  (0.412) 
LnAlpha   -0.664***  -0.666*** 
   (-4.562)  (-4.400) 
Observations   939  875 
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Multivariate Analysis 
Duration to Approval  
Table 3 presents results from the negative binomial regression of months to CTR 
approval.  Hypothesis 1a predicts that firms requiring greater monitoring under SOX 408  
 have significantly longer duration to approval.  The coefficient for PE_RATIO is 
positive and significant (p<0.01), however HIGH_MVE has negative coefficient 
(p<0.10), and HIGH_VOLATILITY and RESTATEMENT are not significant in this 
model.  Hypothesis 2a predicts that proprietary costs are associated with duration to 
approval.  I find little support for this hypothesis, suggesting that the SEC’s decisions to 
apply greater scrutiny to or comment on a firm’s application for confidential treatment 
have little association with the nature of product market competition or proprietary costs 
faced by the registrant.  Finally, Hypothesis 3a predicts that firms exhibiting red flags 
have significantly longer duration to approval.  Firms disclosing material weaknesses 
(ICMW, p<0.05) and firms previously investigated by the SEC (SEC_INVETIG, p<0.05) 
have significantly longer approval times than firms without these red flags, supporting 
Hypothesis 4a.  These findings suggest that the SEC applies greater scrutiny to firms 
requiring greater monitoring under SOX 408 and to firms exhibiting red flags but that 
proprietary costs have little association with duration to approval. 
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Duration of the Protection Period 
 Table 4 presents the results from estimating a negative binomial regression 
examining the influence of the SOX 408 criteria, proprietary costs, and red flags on the 
protection period.  Hypothesis 2a proposes that the SEC grants shorter protection periods 
to firms requiring greater monitoring under SOX 408, Hypothesis 2b proposes that the 
SEC grants longer protection periods to firms with high proprietary costs, and 
Hypothesis 4b proposes that firms exhibiting red flags receiving shorter protection 
periods.  Most SOX 408 measures are not significant in this model, however the 
coefficient on HIGH_MVE is positive and significant (p<0.05) contrary to predictions, 
indicating that the largest firms receive longer protection periods.  In addition, red flag 
measures are not significantly associated with the protection period.   
I find substantial support for Hypothesis 2b predicting an association between 
proprietary costs and the protection period.  I find a negative association between 
industry concentration (LOG_FIRMS, p<0.05) and the protection period, suggesting that 
firms operating in more competitive industries have lower proprietary costs.  The 
coefficient for operating segments is negative and significant (SEGMENTS, p<0.10), 
consistent with firms reporting fewer operating segments having greater proprietary 
costs to disclosure.  Finally, industry research and development expense (IND_RD, 
p<0.01) and capital expenditures (IND_CAPX, p<0.01) are positively associated with the 
protection period, suggesting that firms in industries with greater barriers to entry 
document stronger claims of proprietary costs.  Overall, these findings suggest that the 
SEC’s decisions as to the duration of the protection period are determined primarily  
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TABLE 4 
Negative binomial regression of determinants of the protection period 
     
 Predicted 
Sign 
 PROTECTION 
PERIOD 
 PROTECTION 
PERIOD 
      
Section 408 Measures      
PE_RATIO  -  -0.000  0.001 
   (-0.032)  (0.450) 
HIGH_MVE -  0.207##  0.208## 
   (2.274)  (2.286) 
HIGH_VOLATILITY -    0.005 
     (0.105) 
Proprietary Costs      
RD +  -0.010  -0.015 
   (-0.782)  (-1.152) 
LOG_FIRMS -  -0.039**  -0.036* 
   (-2.163)  (-1.852) 
SEGMENTS +/-  -0.070*  -0.093** 
   (-1.955)  (-2.541) 
IND_ROA +  -0.002  -0.001 
   (-0.480)  (-0.301) 
IND_RD +  0.447***  0.419*** 
   (3.463)  (3.150) 
IND_CAPX +  2.830***  2.915*** 
   (3.863)  (3.896) 
Red Flags      
RESTATEMENT -  -0.002  -0.042 
   (-0.039)  (-0.633) 
ICMW -  0.002  0.023 
   (0.031)  (0.328) 
SEC_INVESTIG -  -0.021  0.037 
   (-0.214)  (0.368) 
Firm Characteristics      
FOREIGN_FILER   0.285***  0.278*** 
   (3.014)  (2.855) 
FORM_8-K   0.092*  0.059 
   (1.657)  (0.970) 
ROA   -0.018  -0.101 
   (-0.152)  (-0.744) 
DEBT_RATIO   0.025  0.017 
   (0.430)  (0.225) 
NEG_CFO   -0.025  -0.055 
   (-0.450)  (-0.979) 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
 Predicted 
Sign 
 PROTECTION 
PERIOD 
 PROTECTION 
PERIOD 
      
BIGN   0.015  0.012 
   (0.239)  (0.189) 
FOLLOWING   -0.017  -0.031 
   (-0.291)  (-0.507) 
EXHIBIT_COUNT   0.052***  0.054*** 
   (4.338)  (4.509) 
Constant   1.749***  1.803*** 
   (10.591)  (10.346) 
lnAlpha   -1.834***  -1.914*** 
   (-16.498)  (-15.678) 
Observations   939  875 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 based on two tailed tests unless indicated by a sign prediction.  
Standard errors are clustered by firm.   
Models include year and quarter indicators. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. 
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by proprietary costs and not the public interest in promoting disclosure or the threat of 
legislative oversight.  
Probability of Successful Redaction  
Table 5 presents the results of estimating a logistic regression on the probability 
of successfully obtaining CTR approval, without un-redacting previously withheld 
information.  Hypothesis 3a predicts that firms requiring greater monitoring under SOX 
408 have lower odds of success, Hypothesis 3b proposes that firms with low proprietary 
costs have lower odds of success, and Hypothesis 4c predicts that firms exhibiting red 
flags have lower odds of success.  The coefficients on PE_RATIO (p<0.05) and 
HIGH_VOLATILITY (p<0.05) are negative and significant, indicating that firms posing 
greater disclosure risk to investors have lower odds of successful redaction.  Proprietary 
costs generally are not significant predictors of success.  Finally, firms disclosing 
restatements in prior years (RESTATEMENT, p<0.10) and firms disclosing material 
weaknesses in prior years (ICMW, p<0.05) have significantly higher odds of success, 
inconsistent with H4c.  These findings suggest that firms exhibiting red flags are more 
likely to redact only eligible information from material contract filings.  Although my 
tests cannot identify the underlying cause for these findings, it is possible that firms with 
low financial reporting quality make disclosure decisions to avoid further erosion of 
their financial reporting quality.  
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TABLE 5 
 
Logistic regression on the probability of successful redaction  
 
 Predicted 
Sign 
 
SUCCESS  SUCCESS 
      
Section 408 Measures      
PE_RATIO  -  -0.059**  -0.038 
   (-2.184)  (-1.026) 
HIGH_MVE -  0.569  0.474 
   (0.603)  (0.571) 
HIGH_VOLATILITY -    -0.634** 
     (-1.712) 
Proprietary Costs      
RD +  0.059  0.023 
   (0.839)  (0.246) 
LOG_FIRMS -  -0.178*  -0.171* 
   (-1.597)  (-1.506) 
SEGMENTS +  -0.110  -0.180 
   (-0.469)  (-0.686) 
IND_ROA +  0.034  0.034 
   (1.146)  (1.194) 
IND_RD +  0.818  0.506 
   (0.784)  (0.453) 
IND_CAPX +  -2.034  -2.853 
   (-0.400)  (-0.493) 
Red Flags      
RESTATEMENT -  0.597#  0.595 
   (1.679)  (1.465) 
ICMW -  1.135##  1.185# 
   (2.046)  (1.930) 
SEC_INVESTIG -  -0.237  0.040 
   (-0.355)  (0.051) 
Firm Characteristics      
FOREIGN_FILER   -1.233**  -1.622** 
   (-1.967)  (-2.558) 
FORM_8-K   -0.613  -0.994** 
   (-1.557)  (-2.370) 
ROA   1.658***  1.652** 
   (3.378)  (2.498) 
DEBT_RATIO   0.377  0.341 
   (1.183)  (0.784) 
NEG_CFO   0.355  0.193 
   (0.966)  (0.497) 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
Predicted 
Sign  SUCCESS  SUCCESS 
BIGN   0.409  0.069 
   (1.149)  (0.163) 
FOLLOWING   0.340  0.282 
   (1.102)  (0.758) 
EXHIBIT_COUNT   -0.207***  -0.169** 
   (-2.732)  (-2.157) 
MONTHS_TO_APPROVAL   -0.508***  -0.504*** 
   (-6.359)  (-6.142) 
Constant   4.238***  4.987*** 
   (3.094)  (3.358) 
Observations   939  875 
ROC   0.873  0.869 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 based on two tailed tests unless indicated by a sign prediction.  
Standard errors are clustered by firm.   
Models include year and quarter indicators. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. 
 
 
 
The results from Tables 3, 4, and 5 indicate that proprietary costs influence the 
duration of time the SEC agrees to protect information from disclosure, but proprietary 
costs do not influence the amount of scrutiny the SEC applies to firms nor do they 
influence the success of the request.  In addition, the SEC incorporates the public interest 
in promoting disclosure to investors when reviewing CTRs as firms requiring greater 
monitoring under SOX 408 have longer duration to approval (PE_RATIO) and lower 
odds of success (PE_RATIO and HIGH_VOLATILITY).   Finally, the SEC applies 
greater scrutiny to firms with red flags although red flag firms have higher odds of 
success.  Taken together, this pattern indicates that the SEC applies greater scrutiny 
(perceives greater risk) to firms with red flags even though red flag firms are less likely 
to make ineligible redactions than other firms.  These findings are consistent with the 
SEC incorporating different aspects of the public interest when reviewing regulatory 
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exemptions and with the SEC reviewing CTRs to reduce the threat of legislative 
oversight because the SEC devotes additional resources to reviewing CTRs that are more 
likely to qualify for confidential treatment.   
Analysis on 2008 Sample and Hazard Model 
The sample of approved CTRs filed on EDGAR excludes CTRs that were 
requested but have not yet been approved by the SEC.  To avoid excluding CTRs 
pending approval, I search material contract filings between 5/1/08 and 12/31/08 to 
identify redactions.  I then match redacted exhibits to CT Orders approved through 
November 30, 2009 to construct a sample of all CTRs requested between May 2008 and 
December 2008 (hereafter, the 2008 sample).  The 2008 sample consists of 579 
approved CTRs and 64 CTRs that have not been approved as of November 30, 2009.  I 
also verify that unapproved CTRs were not withdrawn by the registrant by searching the 
explanations for subsequent amended filings.   
I also examine the material contract filings associated with the CTR to determine 
the nature of the information redacted and categorize the contracts.  I restrict this sample 
to the 2008 sample to limit the data collection.  I set a series of  indicator variables equal 
to one if the material contract concerns a credit agreement, a security interest, a litigation 
settlement, an executive compensation contract, an executive severance agreement, a 
procurement agreement between a buyer and seller, a contract to purchase or lease 
equipment or property, a stock transaction agreement, an agreement for outside 
professional services, a research and development partnership agreement, a licensing 
agreement, and a merger or acquisition agreement.  
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Table 6 presents descriptive and univariate statistics for the 2008 sample.  Table 
6, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the nature of the redacted material contract. 
42 percent of approved CTRs were requested for Supplier/Customer contracts, 32 
percent of redacted contracts were licensing agreements, 17 percent of redacted contracts 
were equipment purchases or material leasing agreements, and 12 percent of redacted 
contracts were research and development partnerships.  Other contract types each 
comprised less than 10 percent of approved CTRs.  Among pending CTRs, 31 percent of 
redacted contracts are credit agreements, 30 percent are stock transactions, 18 percent 
are licensing agreements, 14 percent are supplier agreements, and the remaining 
categories constitute less than 10 percent of redactions pending approval.  In Table 6, 
Panel B, the mean number of exhibits redacted is similar between approved (1.60 
exhibits) and pending CTRs (1.32 exhibits).  Finally, the mean days to approval for the 
2008 sample equals 64.7 and the mean days to right censor equals 414.2. 
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TABLE 6 
 
Descriptive statistics for 2008 CTR requests  
 
Panel A:  Descriptive statistics for contract types of CTRs requested in 2008 sample 
 
  
Approved CT Order 
 
Pending CT Order 
Contract Type Redacted 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
N 
 
Mean 
         Credit Agreement 
 
536 
 
9% 
 
64 
 
31% 
Security Interest 
 
536 
 
1% 
 
64 
 
0% 
Lawsuit 
 
536 
 
2% 
 
64 
 
3% 
Compensation Contract 
 
536 
 
8% 
 
64 
 
9% 
Executive Severance 
 
536 
 
1% 
 
64 
 
6% 
Supplier/Customer 
 
536 
 
42% 
 
64 
 
14% 
Equipment/Lease 
 
536 
 
17% 
 
64 
 
8% 
Stock Transactions 
 
536 
 
8% 
 
64 
 
30% 
Outside Services 
 
536 
 
10% 
 
64 
 
2% 
R&D 
 
536 
 
12% 
 
64 
 
6% 
Licensing 
 
536 
 
32% 
 
64 
 
18% 
Merger/Acq 
 
536 
 
2% 
 
64 
 
0% 
Other 
 
536 
 
2% 
 
64 
 
0% 
 
Panel B:  Duration to approval, protection period and number of exhibits redacted for 
2008 sample 
 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
25% 
 
50% 
 
75% 
 
95% 
Days to Approval 536 
 
64.72 
 
61.75 
 
28 
 
42 
 
78 
 
185 
Days to Censor 64 
 
414.2 
 
135.39 
 
360 
 
438 
 
521 
 
570 
Protection Period  536 
 
5.04 
 
3.53 
 
2 
 
5 
 
9 
 
10 
              
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
25% 
 
50% 
 
75% 
 
95% 
# Exhibits Redacted 536 
 
1.60 
 
1.32 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
4 
# Exhibits Requested 64 
 
1.32 
 
86.53 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
Panel C:  Univariate tests of mean differences between approved and pending CTRs 
 
 
Approved CTR 
 
Pending CTR 
  
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
T 
Stat 
Dependent Variables 
             DURATION 536 
 
64.726 
 
61.750 
 
59 
 
414.220 
  
135.394 
  
35.22 
PROECTECTION_PERIOD 536 
 
5.533 
 
3.244 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
SUCCESS 536 
 
0.946 
 
0.226 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
              Section 408 Measures 
             HIGH_MVE 536 
 
0.116 
 
0.320 
 
59 
 
0.559 
 
0.501 
 
9.45 
PE_RATIO 508 
 
-0.086 
 
6.464 
 
26 
 
6.084 
 
30.988 
 
3.33 
BETA 479 
 
0.263 
 
0.441 
 
0 
 
0 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
              Proprietary Costs 
             H_INDEX SIC 536 
 
469.14 
 
369.21 
 
58 
 
398.410 
 
231.84 
 
1.42 
LOG_FIRMS 536 
 
7.327 
 
1.540 
 
59 
 
7.858 
 
1.839 
 
2.46 
RD 536 
 
-0.198 
 
1.923 
 
59 
 
-0.135 
 
0.662 
 
0.25 
SEGMENTS 536 
 
0.950 
 
0.761 
 
59 
 
0.451 
 
0.735 
 
4.79 
IND_RD 536 
 
0.246 
 
0.354 
 
59 
 
0.139 
 
0.411 
 
2.16 
IND_CAPX 536 
 
0.045 
 
0.030 
 
59 
 
0.086 
 
0.075 
 
7.93 
IND_ROA 536 
 
-0.806 
 
1.976 
 
59 
 
-0.975 
 
2.592 
 
0.60 
              Red Flags 
             SEC_INVESTIG 536 
 
0.080 
 
0.272 
 
59 
 
0.017 
 
0.130 
 
1.76 
RESTATEMENT 536 
 
0.323 
 
0.468 
 
59 
 
0.339 
 
0.477 
 
0.25 
ICMW 536 
 
0.177 
 
0.382 
 
59 
 
0.339 
 
0.477 
 
3.00 
              Firm Characteristics 
             ROA 535 
 
-0.082 
 
0.220 
 
55 
 
-0.049 
 
0.657 
 
0.81 
DEBT_RATIO 536 
 
0.257 
 
0.415 
 
59 
 
7.618 
 
54.621 
 
3.14 
LOSS 536 
 
0.593 
 
0.492 
 
59 
 
0.424 
 
0.498 
 
2.51 
NEG_CF 536 
 
0.494 
 
0.500 
 
59 
 
0.271 
 
0.448 
 
3.28 
BIGN 536 
 
0.731 
 
0.444 
 
58 
 
0.569 
 
0.500 
 
2.61 
EXHIBIT_COUNT 536 
 
1.601 
 
1.296 
 
59 
 
1.305 
 
0.650 
 
1.72 
FOLLOWING 536 
 
0.601 
 
0.490 
 
59 
 
0.203 
 
0.406 
 
6.00 
FOREIGN_FILER 536 
 
0.030 
 
0.170 
 
59 
 
0.102 
 
0.305 
 
2.78 
FORM_8K 536 
 
0.168 
 
0.374 
 
59 
 
0.305 
 
0.464 
 
2.60 
              
See Appendix C for variable definitions. 
Bold indicates significant at p<0.05. 
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Table 6, Panel C presents univariate differences between the approved and 
pending CTRs.  Firms receiving approval have significantly smaller disparities in the 
P/E Ratios (PE_RATIO, p<0.01).  The mean for HIGH_MVE among approved firms 
(11%) is proportional to the Compustat universe, however 56% of pending CTRs are in 
the highest decile of market value of equity.  As compared to pending CTR applications, 
approved CTR firms operate in more concentrated industries (LOG_FIRMS, p<0.05), 
report more operating segments (SEGMENTS, p<0.01), report significant higher research 
and development expenditures (IND_RD, p<0.05) and significantly lower capital 
expenditures (IND_CAPX, p<0.01).  Approved firms have lower debt ratios 
(DEBT_RATIO, p<0.01), are more likely to report a loss (LOSS, p<0.01) and negative 
operating cash flow (NEG_CF, p<0.01), and are more likely to retain a Big N auditor 
(BIGN, p<0.05).  There are no significant differences between groups for ROA or 
EXHIBIT_COUNT.  Firms with unapproved CTRs are significantly more likely to have 
reported a material weakness (ICMW, p<0.01).   
Table 7 presents multivariate evidence examining the SEC’s approval decisions, 
controlling for the nature of the redacted contract.  First, I perform a duration analysis on 
the 2008 sample using both approved and unapproved CTRs to determine whether the 
inferences from Table 3 are sensitive to the exclusion of CTRs pending approval. 
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TABLE 7 
  
Multivariate analysis examining firms requesting confidential treatment in 2008 
Panel A:  Duration to approval or right censor using a Cox proportional hazard model 
 
 Predicted 
Sign 
 Days to Approval or 
Right Censor 
    
Section 408 Measures    
PE_RATIO  -  -0.031*** 
   (-9.065) 
HIGH_MVE -  0.318** 
   (2.113) 
Proprietary Costs    
RD +  0.041** 
   (1.969) 
LOG_FIRMS +/-  0.050 
   (0.677) 
SEGMENTS +  -0.000 
   (-0.009) 
IND_ROA +  0.039 
   (0.189) 
IND_RD +  0.003 
   (0.119) 
IND_CAPX +  3.911** 
   (1.887) 
Red Flags    
RESTATEMENT -  -0.019 
   (-0.147) 
ICMW -  -0.089 
   (-0.652) 
SEC_INVESTIG -  -0.316** 
   (-1.808) 
    
Firm and CTR Controls   Yes 
Contract Type   Yes 
Year and Quarter    Yes 
    
Observations   533 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests unless indicated by sign prediction. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
 
Panel B:  Multivariate analysis examining the association between contract type and CTR 
decisions 
 
 DAYS_TO_APPROVAL  PROTECTION_PERIOD  SUCCESS 
      
Credit Agreement -0.188  -0.080  1.733* 
 (-1.255)  (-0.708)  (1.839) 
Executive Compensation 0.058  -0.287**  0.503 
 (0.438)  (-2.326)  (0.564) 
Severance Agreement 0.517***  -0.158  a 
 (3.157)  (-1.080)   
Purchasing/Supplier 0.057  0.003  -0.062 
 (0.822)  (0.055)  (-0.169) 
Equipment or Lease -0.002  0.117**  -0.062 
 (-0.024)  (1.964)  (0.169) 
Licensing -0.072  0.116**  0.140 
 (-0.845)  (2.460)  (0.409) 
R&D Partnership -0.008  0.170**  0.548 
 (-0.063)  (2.501)  (0.605) 
Outside Professional 
Services 
0.350  0.120  0.095 
 (1.508)  (1.039)  (0.155) 
Stock Transaction 0.052  -0.117  -0.516 
 (0.328)  (-1.325)  (0.990) 
      
SOX 408 Measures Yes  Yes  Yes 
Proprietary Costs Yes  Yes  Yes 
Red Flags Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm and CTR Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Quarter Indicators Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
Observations 534  534  503 
a Variable omitted due to perfect predictor of success. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests unless indicated by sign prediction. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. 
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 This test also incorporates the type of contract in the analysis.  I use a Cox proportional 
hazard model to examine the conditional probability of a CTR being approved at time 
t+d given that approval has not taken place at time t.
18
  For unapproved CTRs, I 
calculate the days to right censor equal to the difference between the filing date and 
either 11/30/09, the date of the last filing in EDGAR (if before 11/30/09), or the date the 
registrant indicates in an SEC filing that they are ceasing operations.  I estimate the 
following model using days between request and approval or right censor (Model 4): 
h(t)=a(t)exp(α + β1-3Section 408n + β4-9Proprietary Costsn + β10-12Red Flagsn +
   β13-20Firm and CTR Controlsn + β24-36Contract Typen) 
Where a(t) is the function of time and: 
 h(t) = (probability of approval between time t and time t + d) /  
d(probability of approval after time t) 
This model includes indicator variables for quarter and I cluster the standard 
errors by firm to control for time-series correlation.  The results of this model are 
presented in Table 7, Panel A.  The inferences are generally consistent with those 
reported in Table 3.  Specifically, the coefficients for the P/E Ratio (PE_RATIO, p<0.01) 
and SEC Investigations (SEC_INVESTIG, p<0.05) are negative and significant, 
indicating lower odds of approval at a point in time, hence, longer review periods.  
Again, proprietary costs are not significant determinants of duration to approval.  Table 
7, Panel B presents coefficient estimates for the nature of information redacted based on 
                                                 
18 
The proportional hazard model is advantageous in that it does not require specification of the functional 
form of time (Alison 1984).  I perform supplemental tests to confirm that the proportional hazard 
assumption is satisfied.  
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the type of underlying contract.  Column 1 reports results for the duration analysis and 
indicates that contract type generally is not a significant determinant of duration to 
approval.  Column 2 reports results for the protection period.  The coefficient for 
compensation contracts is negative and significant (p<0.05), suggesting significantly 
shorter protection periods however this finding may be due to compensation contracts 
have shorter terms than long-term contracts.  The positive and significant coefficients for 
research and development partnerships (p<0.05), licensing agreements (p<0.05), and 
equipment or lease transactions (p<0.05) indicate longer protection periods, suggesting 
that the SEC views these contracts as imposing greater proprietary costs to disclosure.  
Finally, Column 3 presents coefficient estimates for the odds of success.  Generally, 
contract type is not associated with the odds of success.  Overall, these findings suggest 
that the nature of the underlying contract influences the SEC’s decisions concerning the 
duration of protection, but not the scrutiny applied to a CTR or the eligibility of the 
redacted information.   
Selection Bias 
 I consider two potential sources of selection bias.  First, firms’ decisions to 
request confidential treatment may not arise randomly across firms.  Second, firms may 
choose to file a material contract on an 8-K versus a periodic filing because the time 
required to prepare CTRs may exceed the statutory four day filing requirement for 8-Ks.  
Thus, CTRs filed within the narrow window may differ systematically in complexity or 
the expertise of legal counsel from other CTRs.   
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TABLE 8 
Selection model for firms’ decisions to redact from SEC filings 
Panel A:  Univariate statistics for redacting versus non-redacting firms (2007 data) 
 
REDACT=0  
 
REDACT=1  
  
N 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
T 
Stat 
VW Determinants 
             
EQUITY_ISSUE 6100 
 
0.038 
 
0.191 
 
754 
 
0.055 
 
0.229 
 
2.31 
DEBT_ISSUE 6100 
 
0.485 
 
0.499 
 
754 
 
0.408 
 
0.491 
 
3.99 
ROA 6100 
 
-0.28 
 
1.353 
 
754 
 
-0.23 
 
0.839 
 
0.97 
LOSS 6100 
 
0.346 
 
0.475 
 
754 
 
0.527 
 
0.499 
 
9.8 
PENSION 6100 
 
5.75 
 
2.822 
 
754 
 
4.676 
 
2.237 
 
0.68 
H_INDEX 6100 
 
0.274 
 
0.266 
 
754 
 
0.239 
 
0.234 
 
3.47 
#CONTRACTS 6100 
 
32.42 
 
20.84 
 
754 
 
39.27 
 
18.95 
 
8.59 
Additional Firm Characteristics 
          
SEGMENTS 6100 
 
1.595 
 
0.944 
 
754 
 
1.694 
 
0.778 
 
2.76 
FOREIGN_OP 6100 
 
0.300 
 
0.458 
 
754 
 
0.34 
 
0.474 
 
2.28 
PENSION 6100 
 
0.663 
 
0.472 
 
754 
 
0.689 
 
0.462 
 
1.43 
DIVIDENDS 6100 
 
0.029 
 
0.169 
 
754 
 
0.022 
 
0.148 
 
1.07 
BIGN 6100 
 
0.594 
 
0.491 
 
754 
 
0.708 
 
0.454 
 
6.02 
NEG_CF 6100 
 
0.274 
 
0.446 
 
754 
 
0.406 
 
0.491 
 
7.56 
INTANGIBLES 6100 
 
0.101 
 
0.174 
 
754 
 
0.115 
 
0.176 
 
2.08 
CAPX 6100 
 
0.219 
 
0.256 
 
754 
 
0.189 
 
0.216 
 
3.08 
RD 6100 
 
0.051 
 
0.144 
 
754 
 
0.137 
 
0.221 
 
14.4 
#FOLLOWING 6100 
 
3.982 
 
5.677 
 
754 
 
5.271 
 
0.224 
 
5.82 
Proprietary Costs 
             
LOG_FIRMS 5352 
 
8.086 
 
2.033 
 
699 
 
7.301 
 
1.596 
 
9.8 
%COMPUSTAT 5352 
 
0.045 
 
0.079 
 
699 
 
0.103 
 
0.121 
 
16.7 
IND_RD 5352 
 
0.121 
 
0.337 
 
699 
 
0.244 
 
0.378 
 
8.94 
IND_CAPX 5352 
 
0.052 
 
0.054 
 
699 
 
0.045 
 
0.035 
 
2.97 
IND_PPE 5352 
 
0.221 
 
0.215 
 
691 
 
0.19 
 
0.171 
 
3.56 
IND_ROA 5318 
 
-0.66 
 
2.02 
 
691 
 
-0.09 
 
2.304 
 
3.12 
Red Flags 
             
RESTATEMENT 2008 6100 
 
0.062 
 
0.241 
 
754 
 
0.079 
 
0.271 
 
1.82 
WELLS 2008 6100 
 
0.005 
 
0.071 
 
754 
 
0.016 
 
0.125 
 
3.56 
ICMW 2007 6100 
 
0.101 
 
0.641 
 
754 
 
0.172 
 
0.786 
 
2.81 
Refer to Appendix C for variable definitions 
          (continued on next page) 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
Panel B:  Replication of Verrecchia and Weber (2006) determinants of redaction decision  
 
 All Firms  Smallest 25%  Smallest 10% 
 REDACT  REDACT  REDACT 
      
EQUITY_ISSUE 0.163*  0.598**  a 
 (1.672)  (2.435)   
DEBT_ISSUE -0.194***  -0.264**  0.041 
 (-4.424)  (-2.554)  (0.207) 
H_INDEX  (SIC) -0.226***  -0.438**  -0.756* 
 (-2.685)  (-2.381)  (-1.858) 
ROA 0.070***  -0.063**  -0.049 
 (3.085)  (-1.984)  (-1.241) 
LOSS 0.478***  0.461***  0.121 
 (9.990)  (3.752)  (0.403) 
LOG_ASSETS 0.009  0.264***  0.253** 
 (0.809)  (5.162)  (2.227) 
# CONTRACTS 0.007***  0.016***  0.016** 
 (8.026)  (5.355)  (2.368) 
Constant -1.577***  -2.634***  -2.266*** 
 (-20.423)  (-13.346)  (-6.967) 
Observations 6854  1694  660 
Pseudo R-squared 0.044  0.130  0.092 
ROC 0.667  0.773  0.758 
a Variable omitted as a perfect predictor of success 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests unless indicated by sign prediction. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. 
(continued on the next page) 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
Panel C:  Additional firm and industry level characteristics on the decision to redact 
information from an SEC filing 
 
  All Firms  Smallest 25%  Smallest 10% 
  REDACT  REDACT  REDACT 
EQUITY_ISSUE  0.200  0.199  a 
  (1.628)  (0.472)   
DEBT_ISSUE  -0.166***  -0.261**  0.047 
  (-3.188)  (-2.279)  (0.214) 
ROA  0.088***  -0.036  -0.045 
  (3.363)  (-1.025)  (-0.991) 
LOSS  0.379***  0.472***  0.034 
  (6.624)  (3.288)  (0.106) 
LOG_ASSETS  -0.012  0.224***  0.251* 
  (-0.752)  (3.754)  (1.955) 
SEGMENTS  -0.016  -0.046  -0.035 
  (-0.475)  (-0.640)  (-0.219) 
FOREIGN_OP  0.100  -0.168  a 
  (1.624)  (-0.936)   
PENSION  0.056  0.084  -0.216 
  (0.987)  (0.789)  (-0.790) 
DIVIDENDS  -0.047  a  a 
  (-0.218)     
BIGN  0.241***  0.142  -0.699 
  (3.859)  (1.168)  (-1.450) 
# CONTRACTS  0.007***  0.016***  0.013 
  (6.815)  (4.708)  (1.525) 
LOG_FIRMS  -0.049***  -0.001  0.138* 
  (-2.950)  (-0.026)  (1.762) 
%PUBLIC  2.083***  1.814***  2.677** 
  (7.357)  (3.415)  (2.436) 
IND_ROA  -0.033***  0.004  0.244 
  (-3.018)  (0.119)  (1.460) 
IND_RD  0.083  -0.127  0.199 
  (1.284)  (-0.879)  (0.577) 
IND_CAPX  -2.029***  -4.657***  -5.258 
  (-3.552)  (-2.914)  (-1.316) 
Constant  -1.363***  -2.513***  -3.036*** 
  (-7.569)  (-6.301)  (-3.768) 
Observations  5165  1412  520 
Pseudo R-squared  0.103  0.158  0.126 
ROC  0.732  0.787  0.792 
a Variable omitted as a perfect predictor of success 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests unless indicated by sign prediction. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
Panel D:  Main analysis controlling for firm’s selection decision to request confidential 
treatment 
 
  MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
 PROTECTION 
PERIOD 
 SUCCESS 
Inverse Mills Ratios       
IMR – REDACT  0.160  -0.135  0.761 
  (0.619)  (-1.047)  (0.932) 
Section 408 Measures       
PE_RATIO   0.021**  0.001  -0.039 
  (2.415)  (0.459)  (-1.012) 
HIGH_MVE  -0.282*  0.224**  0.376 
  (-1.936)  (2.406)  (0.451) 
HIGH_VOLATILITY  -0.123  -0.003  -0.579 
  (-1.152)  (-0.057)  (-1.580) 
Proprietary Costs       
RD  -0.009  -0.015  0.026 
  (-0.402)  (-1.145)  (0.278) 
LOG_FIRMS  0.044  -0.036*  -0.177 
  (1.105)  (-1.863)  (-1.520) 
SEGMENTS  -0.029  -0.093**  -0.168 
  (-0.397)  (-2.547)  (-0.633) 
IND_ROA  0.007  -0.001  0.035 
  (0.829)  (-0.291)  (1.332) 
IND_RD  0.132  0.383***  0.721 
  (0.518)  (2.723)  (0.616) 
IND_CAPX  -1.023  2.985***  -3.377 
  (-0.709)  (4.009)  (-0.572) 
Red Flags       
RESTATEMENT  -0.096  -0.038  0.577 
  (-0.747)  (-0.585)  (1.421) 
ICMW  0.270**  0.018  1.220** 
  (2.108)  (0.257)  (1.983) 
SEC_INVESTIG  0.385**  0.035  0.047 
  (2.170)  (0.350)  (0.059) 
       
Firm and CTR Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year and Quarter 
Indicators 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
LnAlpha  -0.667***  -1.918***  n/a 
  (-4.403)  (-15.610)   
Observations  875  875  875 
       
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests unless indicated by sign prediction. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
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To address whether the decision to request confidential treatment is a potential 
source of selection bias, I build upon Verrecchia and Weber’s (2006) selection model for 
firms’ decisions to request CTRs.  I classify a firm as redacting information if an 
approved CTR indicates an initial filing date in FY 2008 or 2009 or if the firm filed a 
CTR between 5/1/08 and 12/31/08 and had not secured approval as of 11/30/09.  I 
assume that all other firms did not request confidential treatment during this period.
19
  I 
include the determinants of redaction decisions from Verrecchia and Weber (2006) as 
follows: an indicator variable equal to one if the firm issued equity during 2008 per SDC 
and equal to zero otherwise (EQUITY_ISSUE); an indicator variable equal to one if the 
sum of total short term and total long term debt increased between FY 2007 and FY 
2008 and equal to zero otherwise (DEBT_ISSUE); a Hirfindahl Index of industry 
concentration equal to the sum of the squared market share (firm total revenue/industry 
total revenue) by two digit SIC code at the end of 2007 (H_INDEX SIC); and the number 
of material contracts filed by the registrant during 2008 by summing the number of 
Exhibit 10 filings in EDGAR per CIK (#CONTRACTS).
20
  Finally, I include 
LOG_ASSETS, ROA, and LOSS as of the end of 2007 as previously defined.   
 Table 8, Panel A reports descriptive and univariate statistics comparing redacting 
firms to non-redacting firms with available data in Compustat.  Firms that redact are 
more likely to issue equity (EQUITY_ISSUE, p<0.05) and less likely to issue debt 
                                                 
19 
This assumption does not hold for firms that filed a CTR in 2008 and secured approval for the CTR 
prior to 5/1/08.  However, incorrectly classifying firms as non-redactors reduces the power of my tests. 
20
 Data were obtained by extracting keywords patterned on “EX 10” and “Exhibit 10” from the metadata 
headers in EDGAR filings during 2008.  The number of material contract filings will be incorrect for firms 
with nonstandard or incorrect header fields. 
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(DEBT_ISSUE, p<0.01) than firms that do not redact.  Redacting firms are more likely to 
report a loss in 2007 (LOSS, p<0.01), file material contracts more frequently 
(#CONTRACTS, p<0.01), report a higher number of operating segments (SEGMENTS, 
p<0.01), and are more likely to report foreign operations (FOREIGN, p<0.05).  
Redacting firms are more likely to hire a Big N auditor (BIGN, p<0.01), more likely to 
report negative cash flow from operations (NEG_CF, p<0.01), report higher intangibles 
(INTANGIBLE, p<0.05) and research and development expense (FIRM_RD, p<0.01), 
and have higher analyst following (#FOLLOWING, p<0.01).  Finally, redacting firms are 
more likely to report red flag events such as restatements (RESTATEMENT, p<0.10), 
material weaknesses (ICMW, p<0.01) and receipt of a Wells Notice in 2008 (WELLS, 
p<0.01).  Overall, these univariate tests suggest significant differences between redacting 
and non-redacting firms, including differences in firm performance, firm complexity, 
industry composition, and financial reporting quality.   
Table 8, Panel B presents coefficient estimates for Verrecchia and Weber’s 
(VW’s) selection model applied to firms in 2007.  I find that VW’s determinants have 
adequate discriminate ability for the redaction decisions among the smallest twenty-five 
percent of firms in my sample (ROC = 0.773, pseudo R-squared=0.13) but these 
variables have low discriminate ability for redaction decisions in the full sample of 
Compustat firms (ROC=0.667, pseudo R-squared equal to 0.044). This result is not 
surprising given that VW examine only small firms (market value of equity between $50 
million and $100 million in 2001).  To increase the explanatory power of the model 
including larger firms, I include several additional variables to control for firms’ 
 60 
complexity, proprietary costs, industry characteristics, and the quality of the firm’s 
information environment.  I include proprietary cost variables as described previously 
(IND_CAPX, IND_RD, SEGMENTS, IND_ROA, and LOG_FIRMS), an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm reports foreign income (FOREIGN_OP), an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm is audited by a Big N firm (BIGN), an indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm reports pension assets and liabilities in Compustat (PENSION), 
and an indicator variable equal to one if the firm paid dividends in 2007 and equal to 
zero otherwise (DIVIDENDS).  These results are tabulated in Table 6, Panel C.  
Including these additional variables improves model fit for the full sample to an 
acceptable level (ROC=0.732) (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1980).    
Table 8, Panel D presents coefficient estimates for Model 1, Model 2, and Model 
3 including the Inverse Mills Ratio from using Table 8, Panel C column 1 as the first 
stage to a Heckman MLE selection model.  The coefficient estimates indicate consistent 
inferences concerning the association between red flags and proprietary costs and CTR 
decisions as reported in Tables 3-5 when controlling for firms’ choices to request 
confidential treatment.  In addition, the Inverse Mills Ratio is not statistically significant 
(IMR-REDACT), suggesting that firms’ decisions to redact are not associated with the 
SEC’s decisions to approve CTRs. 
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TABLE 9 
Selection model for the decision to file a material contract on an 8-K or 10-Q/K 
 
Panel A:  Selection Model 
  FORM8-K 
   
DEBT_ISSUE  0.195* 
  (1.691) 
EQUITY_ISSUE  -0.214 
  (-0.870) 
MERGER  -0.023 
  (-0.175) 
LOG_FIRMS  0.014 
  (0.292) 
ROA  -0.186 
  (-0.906) 
LOSS  0.022 
  (0.170) 
LOG_ASSETS  -0.122*** 
  (-3.323) 
#CONTRACTS  -0.097 
  (-1.632) 
   
Industry Dummies  Yes 
Year/Quarter Dummies  Yes 
Constant  -0.468 
  (-0.971) 
   
Observations  998 
Pseudo-R-squared  0.089 
ROC  0.712 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
(continued on next page)  
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TABLE 9 (continued) 
 
Panel B:  Models 1, 2, and 3 with controls for selection bias in the decision to file an 8-K 
and to request confidential treatment 
 
  
MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL  
PROTECTION 
PERIOD  SUCCESS 
       
Inverse Mills Ratios       
IMR – 8-K  0.062  -0.105  0.460 
  (0.297)  (-0.957)  (0.800) 
IMR – REDACT  0.149  -0.105  0.775 
  (0.568)  (-0.817)  (0.930) 
Section 408 
Measures 
      
PE_RATIO   0.022**  0.001  -0.037 
  (2.368)  (0.421)  (-1.015) 
HIGH_MVE  -0.301*  0.251**  0.200 
  (-1.861)  (2.391)  (0.239) 
HIGH_VOLATILITY  -0.111  0.012  -0.651* 
  (-1.017)  (0.248)  (-1.762) 
Proprietary Costs       
RD  -0.009  -0.014  0.022 
  (-0.409)  (-1.080)  (0.228) 
LOG_FIRMS  0.041  -0.037*  -0.176 
  (1.015)  (-1.860)  (-1.534) 
SEGMENTS  -0.030  -0.097***  -0.173 
  (-0.395)  (-2.583)  (-0.645) 
IND_ROA  0.006  -0.002  0.045* 
  (0.677)  (-0.400)  (1.655) 
IND_RD  0.061  0.419***  0.731 
  (0.225)  (2.799)  (0.659) 
IND_CAPX  -2.145  2.873***  1.482 
  (-1.216)  (3.287)  (0.230) 
Red Flags       
RESTATEMENT  -0.101  -0.034  0.579 
  (-0.747)  (-0.515)  (1.332) 
ICMW  0.249*  0.012  1.402** 
  (1.915)  (0.172)  (2.091) 
SEC_INVESTIG  0.394**  0.043  -0.052 
  (2.227)  (0.428)  (-0.064) 
       
Firm and CTR 
Controls 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Indicators  Yes  Yes  No 
Year and Quarter 
Indicators 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
LnAlpha  -0.654***  -1.910***  n/a 
  (-4.328)  (-15.655)   
Observations  865  865  865 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests unless indicated by sign prediction. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
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To examine selection bias arising from the ability to file CTRs quickly, I follow 
E. Li (2010) in developing a first stage model to explain firms’ decisions to file material 
contracts on an 8-K.  The explanatory variables in this model include DEBT_ISSUE,  
EQUITY_ISSUE, LOSS, LOG_FIRMS, ROA, #CONTRACTS, and LOG_ASSETS as 
defined previously; an indicator variable equal to one if the firm entered into merger and 
acquisition activity during the year and equal to zero otherwise (MERGER); and 
indicator variables for industry membership.  These results are reported in Table 9, Panel 
A.  Table 9, Panel B presents coefficient estimates for Models 1-3 including Inverse 
Mills Ratios for firms’ decisions to redact on an 8-K (IMR-8K) and firms’ decisions to 
redact (IMR-REDACT).   Neither Inverse Mills Ratio coefficient is statistically 
significant when included in the main analysis.  These findings indicate that neither the 
decision to redact nor the time required to prepare a CTR are sources of selection bias in 
this analysis.  
The Association between Financial Reporting Quality and Firms’ Decisions to 
Request Confidential Treatment 
Table 10 presents probit regressions of financial reporting quality and red flags 
on the probability of requesting a CTR.  This analysis builds on the selection model 
presented in Table 8 and includes measures of financial reporting quality and red flags as 
defined previously.  The coefficient estimates for reporting restatements 
(RESTATEMENT, p<0.10), internal control material weaknesses (ICMW, p<0.01), and 
firms disclosing receipt of a Wells Notice in 2008 (WELLS, p<0.10) are positive and 
significant, indicating that firms exhibiting red flags are significantly more likely to  
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TABLE 10 
Financial reporting quality and firms’ decisions to request confidential treatment  
   
 REDACT REDACT REDACT REDACT REDACT 
      RESTATEMENT 0.165*     
 (1.895)     
ICMW  0.184***    
  (2.819)    
WELLS   0.411*   
   (1.682)   
DISC_ACCR    -0.023  
    (-1.355)  
UNEXPECTED_FEES     0.135*** 
     (3.248) 
EQUITY_ISSUE 0.190* 0.183 0.195* 0.405*** 0.203 
 (1.660) (1.602) (1.710) (3.143) (1.565) 
DEBT_ISSUE -0.143*** -0.138*** -0.141*** -0.132** -0.150*** 
 (-2.911) (-2.809) (-2.878) (-2.486) (-2.723) 
ROA 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.099*** 0.086*** 0.111*** 
 (3.849) (3.750) (3.824) (3.130) (4.015) 
LOSS 0.377*** 0.364*** 0.379*** 0.349*** 0.381*** 
 (6.926) (6.653) (6.971) (5.949) (6.353) 
LOG_ASSETS -0.038** -0.041*** -0.039** -0.026 -0.024 
 (-2.450) (-2.646) (-2.485) (-1.431) (-1.279) 
#CONTRACTS 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 
 (6.639) (6.585) (6.375) (6.553) (7.458) 
LOG_FIRMS -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.018 -0.018 
 (-2.743) (-2.858) (-2.786) (-1.105) (-1.062) 
SEGMENTS 0.007 0.001 0.007 -0.022 -0.069* 
 (0.212) (0.042) (0.218) (-0.595) (-1.783) 
FOREIGN_OP 0.024 0.012 0.025 0.025 -0.050 
 (0.412) (0.210) (0.418) (0.401) (-0.766) 
PENSION 0.086 0.076 0.086 0.044 0.084 
 (1.595) (1.406) (1.604) (0.761) (1.448) 
DIVIDENDS 0.042 0.059 0.052 -0.109 -0.016 
 (0.289) (0.408) (0.360) (-0.695) (-0.101) 
BIGN 0.233*** 0.239*** 0.232*** 0.249*** 0.220*** 
 (3.916) (4.017) (3.897) (3.840) (3.296) 
%PUBLIC 2.012*** 1.989*** 2.000*** 2.123*** 2.214*** 
 (7.291) (7.214) (7.254) (7.174) (7.375) 
IND_ROA -0.026** -0.026** -0.027** -0.009 -0.025** 
 (-2.385) (-2.384) (-2.497) (-0.695) (-2.138) 
IND_RD 0.096 0.098 0.094 0.088 0.033 
 (1.502) (1.532) (1.472) (1.312) (0.482) 
IND_CAPX -1.439*** -1.459*** -1.387*** -1.774*** -1.772*** 
 (-2.861) (-2.897) (-2.760) (-3.168) (-3.115) 
FOLLOWING 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (3.855) (3.946) (3.735) (2.885) (2.812) 
INTANGIBLES 0.080 0.091 0.091 -0.096 -0.036 
 (0.612) (0.693) (0.692) (-0.678) (-0.253) 
Constant -1.404*** -1.367*** -1.385*** -1.486*** -1.492*** 
 (-8.381) (-8.147) (-8.270) (-8.221) (-8.159) 
Observations 6014 6014 6014 4858 4544 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests unless indicated by sign prediction. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
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redact.
21
  In addition, the coefficient for unexpected audit fees (UNEXPECTED_FEES, 
p<0.01) is positive and significant.  Because CTRs are prepared by legal counsel rather 
than auditors, this finding is not due to the expense associated with preparing and  
defending requests for confidential treatment.  Overall, this table suggests that firms with 
low financial reporting quality are more likely to request confidential treatment.  When 
taken together with the results concerning CTR approval, firms with low financial 
reporting quality are more likely to request CTRs but these requests are also more likely 
to be successful, suggesting that the SEC applies greater scrutiny to these firms although 
these firms are less likely to redact ineligible information. 
Supplemental Analysis  
Disclosure Quality 
Although disclosure quality may influence CTR approval decisions, I cannot test 
the role of disclosure quality on CTR approvals due to the lack of empirical measures of 
disclosure quality.  Instead, I control for firms’ voluntary disclosures outside of SEC 
filings. I use management earnings forecasts to proxy for firms’ voluntary disclosures 
outside of financial reports.  I create an indicator variable equal to one if the firm issued 
management guidance in 2007 per First Call and equal to zero otherwise (CIG). I 
measure company guidance in 2007 because firms’ decisions to issue guidance during 
2008 may not yet be observable at the time the firm requests a CTR.  
Table 11, Panel A reports regression results for Models 1-3 including company-
issued guidance.  The coefficient estimates for company issued guidance (CIG) are not 
                                                 
21  
Wells Notices precede receipt of an AAER.  Disclosure of a Wells Notice in 2008 indicates that the 
firm was currently under SEC investigation.  
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statistically significant and the inferences from coefficient estimates for SOX 408 
criteria, proprietary costs, and red flags are consistent with those reported in Tables 3-5.  
I find no change in inferences concerning the SEC’s decisions when including 
management earnings forecasts in the regression analysis nor is company issued 
guidance a significant determinant of the SEC’s approval decisions. 
I also examine the role of company issued guidance on firms’ decision to request 
confidential treatment.  I include the following variables constructed from First Call in 
the selection model presented in Table 8:  CIG; An indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm issued guidance in 2008 and did not issue guidance in 2007 (INITIATE_CIG) and 
equal to zero otherwise; An indicator variable equal to one if the firm issued company 
guidance in 2007 and did not issue company guidance in 2008 (DISCONTINUE_CIG) 
and equal to zero otherwise; and the percentage of point forecasts out of total forecasts 
issued by management (%POINT).  Table 11, Panel B presents the results of this 
analysis.   
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TABLE 11 
Firm information environment and voluntary disclosure  
Panel A: Company issued guidance and CTR approval decisions 
 
  
MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL  
PROTECTION 
PERIOD  SUCCESS 
       
CIG  0.106  -0.031  0.343 
  (0.822)  (-0.519)  (0.824) 
Section 408 Measures       
PE_RATIO   0.018**  -0.000  -0.058** 
  (2.439)  (-0.005)  (-2.071) 
HIGH_MVE  -0.278*  0.213**  0.530 
  (-1.923)  (2.284)  (0.543) 
Proprietary Costs       
RD  -0.006  -0.009  0.048 
  (-0.315)  (-0.727)  (0.673) 
LOG_FIRMS  0.044  -0.038**  -0.189* 
  (1.189)  (-2.111)  (-1.652) 
SEGMENTS  -0.057  -0.069*  -0.122 
  (-0.836)  (-1.933)  (-0.521) 
IND_ROA  0.008  -0.002  0.032 
  (0.983)  (-0.425)  (1.091) 
IND_RD  0.092  0.443***  0.863 
  (0.409)  (3.404)  (0.824) 
IND_CAPX  -0.647  2.760***  -1.023 
  (-0.458)  (3.684)  (-0.197) 
Red Flags       
RESTATEMENT  -0.077  -0.001  0.596* 
  (-0.640)  (-0.023)  (1.704) 
ICMW  0.212*  0.003  1.097** 
  (1.731)  (0.047)  (2.015) 
SEC_INVESTIG  0.361**  -0.023  -0.232 
  (2.200)  (-0.227)  (-0.349) 
       
Firm and CTR Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Controls  Yes  No  No 
Year and Quarter Indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
lnAlpha  -0.669***  -1.835***  n/a 
  (-4.633)  (-16.478)   
Observations  939  939  939 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests unless indicated by sign prediction. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 11 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Association between company issued guidance and decision to request 
confidential treatment 
 
  REDACT  REDACT  REDACT 
       
INITIATE_CIG    -0.258*   
    (-1.682)   
DISCONTINUE_CIG    0.150   
    (1.416)   
%POINT      0.344** 
      (2.055) 
CIG  0.011  0.054  -0.032 
  (0.195)  (0.875)  (-0.515) 
       
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm-Level Industry  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Controls  No  No  No 
       
Observations  6,280  6,280  6,280 
       
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests unless indicated by sign prediction. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. 
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The coefficient estimate for CIG is not statistically significant, indicating that 
issuing earnings guidance is not associated with firms’ decisions to request confidential 
treatment.  The coefficient estimate for INITIATE_CIG is negative and significant 
(p<0.10), suggesting that firms initiating guidance in 2008 are less likely to redact.  In 
addition, the coefficient estimate for %POINT is positive and significant, suggesting that 
firms may balance withholding proprietary disclosures from investors with greater 
disclosure in other areas.  
Measurement Window on Red Flags 
 To test the sensitivity of my results to time period over which I measure red 
flags, I vary the measurement window on restatements and internal control weaknesses.  
Table 12, Panel A presents the distribution of red flag events by year for firms in the full 
sample.
22
  The number of Section 404 material weaknesses reported in each year from 
2005-2008 is consistent across time with a minimum of 37 firms reporting Section 404 
ICMWs in 2004 and a maximum of 48 firms reporting Section 404 ICMWs in 2005.  
The number of restatements per year is higher in 2005 and 2006, consistent with an 
increase in reported restatements during those two years among SEC registrants (Scholz 
2008).  The number of observations for firms reporting restatements that were 
investigated by the SEC is more variable from year to year, consistent with variation in 
the SEC’s budget and enforcement priorities.    
 
                                                 
22 
Table 12, Panel A tabulates Red Flag events at the firm level rather than using CTRs as the unit of 
observation.  Because some firms file multiple CTRs, these figures do not correspond directly to 
descriptive statistics in Tables 2 and 6.   
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TABLE 12 
 
Varying the measurement window on red flags 
Panel A: Number of sample firms disclosing red flag events in prior and subsequent years 
 
         
Pre 
 
Post 
  
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2008 
 
2009 
              404 ICMW 37 
 
48 
 
38 
 
45 
 
0 
 
45 
 
27 
302 ICMW 5 
 
17 
 
29 
 
54 
 
0 
 
53 
 
26 
RESTATEMENT 41 
 
70 
 
75 
 
52 
 
27 
 
9 
 
33 
FRAUD 2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
SEC_INVESTIG 11 
 
1 
 
15 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
  Note:  Statistics are tabulated at the firm, rather than CTR, level.  
 
 
Panel B:  Varying the measurement window on restatements in negative binomial 
regression of duration to approval 
 
 MONTHS 
TO 
APPROVAL 
 MONTHS 
TO 
APPROVAL 
 MONTHS 
TO 
APPROVAL 
 MONTHS 
TO 
APPROVAL 
 MONTHS 
TO 
APPROVAL 
          
Restate 2006-2007 0.278**         
 (2.42)         
Restate 2008 Before    0.292    0.287   
   (1.526)    (1.498)   
Restate 2008 After      -0.554**  -0.542**   
     (-2.152)  (-2.103)   
Investigation 2008         0.444 
         (1.170) 
          
Proprietary Costs Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm and CTR  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Indicators Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year and Qtr  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
          
Obs 998  998  998  998  998 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 12 (continued) 
Panel C:  Varying the measurement window on restatements in a logistic regression of 
successful redaction 
 
 SUCCESS  SUCCESS  SUCCESS  SUCCESS 
        
Restate 2006-2007 0.843**       
 (2.09)       
Restate 2008 Before CTR   0.256     
   (0.24)     
Restate 2008 After CTR     A   
        
Investigation 2008       A 
        
Proprietary Costs Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm and CTR  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Indicators Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year and Qtr  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
Obs 998  998  998  998 
A Variable is a perfect predictor of success 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
 
Panel D:  Varying the measurement window on ICMWs in negative binomial regression of 
duration to approval and logistic regression on the probability of successful redaction 
 
 MONTHS 
TO 
APPROVAL 
MONTHS 
TO 
APPROVAL 
MONTHS 
TO 
APPROVAL SUCCESS SUCCESS
 
SUCCESS
 
       
ICMW  06-07 0.343***   1.014*   
 (2.66)   (1.83)   
ICMW 2006  0.308*   1.017  
  (1.81)   (1.62)  
ICMW 2007   0.254   0.661 
   (1.54)   (1.04) 
       
Proprietary 
Costs 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm and CTR  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Year and Qtr  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Obs 998 998 998 998 998 998 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
  
 (continued on the next page) 
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TABLE 12 (continued) 
Panel E:  SOX Section 302 material weaknesses in the negative binomial regression of 
duration to approval and logistic regression on the probability of successful redaction 
 
 MONTHS 
TO 
APPROVAL 
MONTHS 
TO 
APPROVAL 
MONTHS 
TO 
APPROVAL 
MONTHS 
TO 
APPROVAL 
MONTHS 
TO 
APPROVAL 
      
302 ICMW 04-07 0.239    0.142 
 (1.19)    (0.79) 
302 ICMW 06-07  0.275    
  (1.39)    
302 ICMW 2006   0.555**   
   (2.02)   
302 ICMW 2007    0.276  
    (1.32)  
      
Red Flags No No No No Yes 
Proprietary Costs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm and CTR Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Quarter 
Indicators  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Obs 998 998 998 998 998 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
 
 
 
 
Table 12, Panel B reports regression results with variations in the measurement 
window for restatements and investigations.  Firms reporting restatements in 2006 or 
2007 have significantly longer duration to approval in the negative binomial regression 
(p<0.05).  The coefficient for firms reporting restatements in 2008 prior to filing a CTR 
is not significant, and firms reporting restatements subsequent to requesting confidential 
treatment have significantly shorter duration to approval (p<0.05).  Table 12, Panel C 
reports regression results for the probability of successful redaction.  Firms reporting 
restatements in 2006 and 2007 have significantly higher odds of success, consistent with 
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the analysis in Table 5.  Firms announcing restatements in 2008 prior to requesting 
confidential treatment have no difference in odds of success.  All firms restating in 2008  
after requesting confidential treatment were successful, therefore precluding estimating a 
regression coefficient.  Table 11, Panel D reports regression coefficient estimates for 
Section 404 ICMWs.  Firms reporting a Section 404 ICMW in 2006 or 2007 have 
significantly longer duration to approval (p<0.01), as do firms reporting Section 404 
ICMWs in 2006 alone (p<0.10).  The coefficient for reporting a Section 404 ICMW in 
2007 is positive but not significant using two tailed tests.   
Consistent with the analysis in Table 5, firms reporting Section 404 ICMWs in 
2006 or 2007 have higher odds of success (p<0.10) but the estimates for reporting 
Section 404 ICMWs in either 2006 or 2007 are not significant at conventional levels.  
Overall, this analysis suggests that the conclusion that the SEC incorporates information 
on red flags into CTR decisions is not sensitive to the window over which red flags are 
measured.  
Table 12, Panel E presents regression coefficient results for Section 302 ICMWs.  
Although reporting a Section 302 ICMW in 2006 is associated with longer duration to 
approval, other measurement windows on Section 302 ICMWs are not significant.  
These results suggest that Section 302 ICMWs are not associated with the SEC’s 
decisions when reviewing CTRs.  This finding is consistent with differences in the 
disclosure of material weaknesses under Section 302 and 404.  Section 404 material 
weaknesses require an adverse audit opinion in addition to disclosure, whereas Section 
302 material weaknesses require only disclosure.  The association between material 
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weaknesses and CTR decisions is consistent with the difference in opinion modification, 
and therefore salience to investors, between the two types of material weaknesses.     
Role of Agency and Staff Workload on CTR Decisions 
The SEC’s agency workload and budget appropriations may potentially influence 
CTR approval decisions.  The main analysis controls for agency workload and budget by 
using year and quarter fixed effects.  In supplemental analysis, I also control for the 
workload or judgment of the individuals approving CTRs within the Division of 
Corporate Finance.  This analysis is included in Table 13.  Including indicator variables 
for the 33 SEC staff members that signed CT Orders in 2008 and 2009 does not affect 
my inferences.   
In addition, Congressional voting records or the preferences of legislators serving 
on agency oversight committees are commonly studied determinants of regulators’ 
discretionary decisions (e.g. Wood and Waterman 1991; Correia 2009).  I do not control 
for the political preferences of legislators or their voting records because my study takes 
place over a short period of time (2008-2009).  However, I examine whether CTR 
approvals differ between 2008 and 2009 because of the change in SEC Chair in January 
2009 and change in political party control of the Legislative and Executive branches 
following the 2008 election.   
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TABLE 13 
 
CTR approval decisions controlling for SEC staff reviewers 
 MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
 PROTECTION     
PERIOD 
 
SUCCESS 
Section 408 Measures      
PE_RATIO  0.016***  -0.001  -0.056** 
 (3.076)  (-0.663)  (-2.040) 
HIGH_MVE -0.059  0.176**  0.742 
 (-0.448)  (2.018)  (0.798) 
Proprietary Costs      
RD 0.027  -0.007  -0.019 
 (0.896)  (-0.357)  (-0.152) 
LOG_FIRMS -0.070  -0.035  0.064 
 (-1.169)  (-1.039)  (0.246) 
SEGMENTS 0.011  -0.001  0.009 
 (1.407)  (-0.232)  (0.217) 
IND_ROA 0.029  0.469***  0.808 
 (0.128)  (3.885)  (0.753) 
IND_RD -0.416  1.758**  -7.786 
 (-0.309)  (2.521)  (-1.252) 
IND_CAPX -0.012  -0.007  0.096 
 (-0.877)  (-0.627)  (1.036) 
Red Flags      
RESTATEMENT -0.129  -0.022  0.599 
 (-1.210)  (-0.398)  (1.440) 
ICMW 0.183*  0.008  1.100* 
 (1.849)  (0.126)  (1.783) 
SEC_INVESTIG 0.239*  0.028  -0.022 
 (1.801)  (0.302)  (-0.028) 
SEC Staff Indicators Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm and CTR Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year and Quarter Indicators Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Indicators Yes  No  No 
      
lnAlpha -1.504***  -2.082***  n/a 
 (-5.497)  (-14.739)   
Observations 939  939  815a 
a Loss of observations is due to some SEC staff members being a perfect predictor of success. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
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TABLE 14 
 
CTR approval decisions partitioned by year requested 
  
MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL  PROTECTION PERIOD  SUCCESS 
  2008  2009  2008  2009  2008  2009 
Section 408 Measures           
PE_RATIO   0.037***  0.009  -0.001  0.001  -0.061  -0.076** 
  (3.645)  (1.403)  (-0.397)  (0.356)  (-0.944)  (-2.408) 
HIGH_MVE  -0.238  -0.212  0.235**  0.166  -0.083  0.897 
  (-1.459)  (-1.004)  (2.214)  (1.258)  (-0.102)  (0.857) 
Proprietary Costs            
RD  -0.047  0.035  -0.014  -0.008  0.130  0.063 
  (-1.637)  (1.545)  (-0.847)  (-0.523)  (0.735)  (1.178) 
LOG_FIRMS  0.018  0.094**  -0.042*  -0.038  -0.376*  -0.065 
  (0.390)  (1.973)  (-1.948)  (-1.478)  (-1.844)  (-0.426) 
SEGMENTS  -0.093  -0.019  -0.039  -0.107**  -0.071  -0.158 
  (-0.979)  (-0.230)  (-0.831)  (-2.329)  (-0.163)  (-0.510) 
IND_ROA  -0.001  0.019  -0.006  0.001  0.090***  -0.307 
  (-0.104)  (1.389)  (-1.144)  (0.102)  (2.578)  (-0.811) 
IND_RD  -0.456  0.648*  0.352**  0.536***  1.176  0.819 
  (-1.559)  (1.884)  (2.245)  (3.070)  (0.666)  (0.448) 
IND_CAPX  -1.056  -0.601  3.642***  2.311**  1.865  -3.012 
  (-0.535)  (-0.316)  (3.559)  (2.417)  (0.181)  (-0.613) 
Red Flags             
RESTATEMENT  -0.050  -0.094  -0.018  0.023  1.254*  0.821 
  (-0.335)  (-0.601)  (-0.235)  (0.293)  (1.655)  (1.367) 
ICMW  0.265*  0.132  0.021  -0.010  0.177  1.828** 
  (1.679)  (0.861)  (0.252)  (-0.103)  (0.173)  (2.238) 
SEC_INVESTIG  0.406**  0.311  0.009  -0.053  0.125  -0.612 
  (2.020)  (1.630)  (0.080)  (0.410)  (0.077)  (-0.676) 
             
Firm and CTR 
Controls 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Calendar Quarter   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Observations  478  461  478  461  478  461 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
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I examine the role of SOX 408 measures, proprietary costs, and red flags on 
MONTHS_TO_APPROVAL, PROTECTION_PERIOD, and SUCCESS separately for 
2008 and 2009 by partitioning on the year in which the firm requested the CTR.  I 
partition on the date requested rather than the date approved because the decision to 
apply scrutiny to a CTR takes place shortly following the request.   
Table 14 reports the results partitioning Models 1-3 by year requested.  I 
generally find consistent inferences in approval decisions across both periods, indicating 
that the change in SEC chair in January 2009 and change in political party control of 
Congress did not influence the SEC’s approval decisions for CTRs.    
Political Connections 
 Congressional Dominance Theory suggests that firms may influence regulatory 
outcomes through campaign contributions to members of Congress.  Correia (2009) 
finds evidence suggesting that campaign contributions to members of Congress made by 
firms prior to engaging in fraudulent financial reporting may reduce the probability of 
receiving an AAER.  To examine whether political contributions influence CTR 
decisions, I re-estimate Models 1-3 and include an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm made campaign contributions during the 2006 election cycle through a political 
action committee as reported by the Federal Election Commission and equal to zero 
otherwise (CONNECTED).  These findings are reported in Table 15.  The coefficient on 
CONNECTED is not statistically significant in any of the three models.  The inferences 
concerning the role of SOX 408 measures, proprietary costs, and red flags on CTR 
decisions remain consistent when controlling for political contributions.  Overall, these  
 78 
TABLE 15 
 
Association between political connections and CTR approval decisions 
  MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
 PROTECTION 
PERIOD 
 
SUCCESS 
       
CONNECTED  -0.128  0.096  0.289 
  (-0.678)  (1.014)  (0.311) 
Section 408 Measures       
PE_RATIO   0.018**  -0.000  -0.058** 
  (2.445)  (-0.012)  (-2.254) 
HIGH_MVE  -0.204  0.155  0.420 
  (-1.238)  (1.425)  (0.354) 
Proprietary Costs       
RD  -0.004  -0.011  0.058 
  (-0.192)  (-0.805)  (0.826) 
LOG_FIRMS  0.048  -0.040**  -0.179 
  (1.301)  (-2.209)  (-1.601) 
SEGMENTS  -0.053  -0.070**  -0.103 
  (-0.778)  (-1.961)  (-0.444) 
IND_ROA  0.009  -0.002  0.034 
  (1.068)  (-0.497)  (1.138) 
IND_RD  0.067  0.456***  0.849 
  (0.298)  (3.555)  (0.816) 
IND_CAPX  -0.954  2.830***  -1.996 
  (-0.682)  (3.837)  (-0.395) 
Red Flags       
RESTATEMENT  -0.079  -0.002  0.592* 
  (-0.653)  (-0.038)  (1.675) 
ICMW  0.223*  -0.001  1.131** 
  (1.784)  (-0.013)  (2.043) 
SEC_INVESTIG  0.361**  -0.022  -0.248 
  (2.154)  (-0.219)  (-0.373) 
       
Firm and CTR Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Controls  Yes  No  No 
Year and Quarter 
Controls 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Observations  939  939  939 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
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findings suggest that political contributions do not influence the duration or outcome of 
CTR decisions.    
Legal Expertise and CTR Approval 
 
Legal expertise may significantly affect CTR quality and therefore the duration 
and outcome of the SEC’s decisions.  I consider the alternate explanation that firms with 
red flags exhibit significantly longer duration to approval because these firms retain 
lower quality legal counsel.  Lower quality legal counsel would not explain why red flag 
firms have significantly higher odds of success than other firms.  Although I cannot 
directly observe the identity of the firm’s legal counsel that prepares CTRs, I expect 
firms’ decisions to retain high quality external legal counsel mirror their decisions to 
retain high quality financial statement auditors.  Accordingly, I expect that firms 
retaining Big N auditors retain high quality legal counsel.  
 I re-estimate Models 1 and 3 and add an interaction for red flags and Big N 
auditor.  Table 16 presents coefficient estimates from the negative binomial regression 
using MONTHS_TO_APPROVAL as the dependent variable.  I find several positive 
coefficients on interactions of red flags and Big N client, contrary to expectations.  The 
coefficients on the interactions of Big N and restatement (BIGN*RESTATEMENT, 
p<0.05) and Big N and SEC investigation (BIGN*SEC_INVESTIG, p<0.10) are positive 
and significant.  These findings suggest that if Big N clients retain high quality legal 
counsel, lower quality legal expertise does not explain why firms exhibiting red flags 
have significantly longer duration to approval.   
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TABLE 16 
 
Interaction of Big N auditor and red flags 
 
 
MONTHS 
TO 
APPROVAL 
MONTHS 
TO 
APPROVAL 
MONTHS 
TO 
APPROVAL SUCCESS SUCCESS SUCCESS 
       
BIGN 0.028 0.132 0.106 0.310 0.375 0.194 
 (0.254) (1.161) (1.014) (0.816) (0.959) (0.534) 
RESTATEMENT -0.206   0.666   
 (-1.408)   (1.390)   
BIGN*RESTATEMENT 0.381**   0.512   
 (2.042)   (0.715)   
ICMW  0.106   0.813  
  (0.654)   (1.205)  
BIGN*ICMW  0.184   0.721  
  (0.888)   (0.771)  
SEC_INVESTIG   -0.018   -0.230 
   (-0.095)   (-0.338) 
BIGN*SEC_INVESTIG   0.474*   1.501 
   (1.879)   (1.241) 
       
Firm and CTR Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Quarter 
Controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 998 998 998 998 998 998 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. 
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Instead, these findings support the conclusion that firms exhibiting red flags 
receive greater scrutiny to avoid political costs because, among firms exhibiting red 
flags, larger firms that invest greater resources in external accounting services require 
longer duration to approval.  I find no association between interactions of Big N auditor 
and red flags on the probability of success, suggesting that legal expertise has little effect 
on the outcome of the decision.  This finding is consistent with the SEC basing CTR 
decisions on the merits of the case and with the SEC providing guidance and assistance 
to firms with lower quality legal counsel.    
Media Attention 
I examine the role of media attention on CTR approval decisions because firms 
with greater media coverage may be better known to the public and therefore may pose 
greater political costs to the SEC in the event of a firm failure.  My proxy for media 
attention is membership on the Fortune World’s Most Admired Companies list because 
widely admired firms maintain high prominence in the media.  I re-estimate Models 1-3 
including an indicator variable equal to one if the firm was listed on the Fortune World’s 
Most Admired Company list in 2007 (MOST_ADMIRED).  Table 17 presents the results 
of this analysis.  The coefficient on MOST_ADMIRED is not statistically significant and 
the coefficient estimates for SOX 408 criteria, proprietary costs, and red flags yield 
inferences consistent with those reported in Tables 3-5.  Overall, these findings suggest 
that media attention has little role in CTR approval decisions. 
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TABLE 17 
 
The role of media attention on CTR approval decisions 
 
  MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
 PROTECTION 
PERIOD 
 
SUCCESS 
       
MOST_ADMIRED  -0.030  0.024  -0.047 
  (-1.046)  (1.358)  (-0.269) 
Section 408 Measures       
PE_RATIO   0.018**  -0.000  -0.059** 
  (2.444)  (-0.010)  (-2.196) 
HIGH_MVE  -0.220  0.167*  0.646 
  (-1.473)  (1.813)  (0.582) 
Proprietary Costs       
RD  -0.004  -0.010  0.059 
  (-0.199)  (-0.781)  (0.837) 
LOG_FIRMS  0.048  -0.040**  -0.178 
  (1.290)  (-2.209)  (-1.588) 
SEGMENTS  -0.053  -0.070**  -0.112 
  (-0.783)  (-1.963)  (-0.476) 
IND_ROA  0.009  -0.003  0.034 
  (1.082)  (-0.540)  (1.150) 
IND_RD  0.071  0.455***  0.799 
  (0.313)  (3.553)  (0.771) 
IND_CAPX  -0.970  2.839***  -2.063 
  (-0.689)  (3.882)  (-0.405) 
Red Flags       
RESTATEMENT  -0.082  0.001  0.593* 
  (-0.679)  (0.022)  (1.668) 
ICMW  0.225*  -0.001  1.145** 
  (1.797)  (-0.009)  (2.050) 
SEC_INVESTIG  0.349**  -0.014  -0.249 
  (2.080)  (-0.141)  (-0.368) 
       
Firm and CTR Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Controls  Yes  Yes  No 
Year and Quarter Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Contract Controls  No  Yes  No 
       
Observations  939  939  939 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. 
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Comment Letter and Duration to Comment Letter Approval 
 I examine the association between the SEC’s decisions when corresponding with 
firms in the comment letter process and CTR approval decisions.  In this analysis, the 
duration of time required to resolve a comment letter proxies for the SEC Staff’s 
perceptions of the firm’s financial reporting quality because prior research suggests that 
longer duration to approval for comment letters reflects comment letter severity (Chen 
and Johnston 2010; Ertimur and Nondorf 2006).  I use the Audit Analytics comment 
letter module to identify correspondence conversations between registered firms and the 
SEC.  Because the SEC does not post comment letter correspondence in EDGAR until 
the resolution of the comment letter, I expect that comment letters publicly released in 
EDGAR on the same day for a firm (dissemination_date per Audit Analytics) pertain to 
the same conversation.  I identify the first and last letter in a comment letter conversation 
and calculate a firm specific average duration to approval for comment letters as the 
natural log of the mean number of days between the first and last comment letter in a 
conversation over the period 2006 to 2010 (COMMENT_DURATION).    
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Table 18, Panel A presents regression results controlling for comment letter 
duration.  I also include MERGER in this test because merger and acquisition activity 
may increase the likelihood that the firm received a comment letter as well as the 
duration of time required to resolve the comment letter.  The coefficient estimate for 
COMMENT_DURATION is not statistically significant, suggesting that comment letter 
duration to approval is not a significant determinant of CTR decisions.  Further, the 
coefficient estimates for SOX 408 criteria, proprietary costs, and red flags yield 
consistent inferences as reported in Tables 3-5.  Table 18, Panel B presents regression 
results for Models 1-3 including the natural log of the number of comment letters the 
firm received between 2006 and 2010 (#COMMENT).  This measure reflects the extent 
to which the SEC initiates correspondence with the firm because higher numbers of 
comment letter initiations reflect more questions raised by SEC staff regarding the firm’s 
financial reports to investors.  The coefficient estimate for #COMMENT is not 
statistically significant in any of the three models and I find no change in the inferences 
from coefficient estimates for SOX 408 criteria, proprietary costs, and red flags when 
controlling for this dimension of the comment letter process. 
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TABLE 18 
 
Association between comment letter decisions and CTR decisions 
Panel A:  Association between comment letter duration to approval and CTR approval 
decisions 
 
  MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
 PROTECTION 
PERIOD 
 
SUCCESS 
       
COMMENT_DURATION  0.081  -0.025  -0.180 
  (1.261)  (-0.751)  (-0.777) 
Section 408 Measures       
PE_RATIO   0.018**  0.000  -0.060** 
  (2.394)  (0.130)  (-2.197) 
HIGH_MVE  -0.351**  0.237***  0.680 
  (-2.439)  (2.602)  (0.741) 
MERGER  0.238**  -0.097*  -0.162 
  (2.149)  (-1.768)  (-0.457) 
Proprietary Costs       
RD  -0.003  -0.012  0.053 
  (-0.119)  (-0.863)  (0.747) 
LOG_FIRMS  0.029  -0.032*  -0.128 
  (0.854)  (-1.736)  (-1.129) 
SEGMENTS  -0.059  -0.061  -0.088 
  (-0.876)  (-1.608)  (-0.378) 
IND_ROA  0.013*  -0.003  0.044** 
  (1.890)  (-0.561)  (2.093) 
IND_RD  0.099  0.429***  0.763 
  (0.432)  (3.256)  (0.729) 
IND_CAPX  -0.701  2.852***  -3.058 
  (-0.501)  (3.840)  (-0.557) 
Red Flags       
RESTATEMENT  -0.097  -0.006  0.603 
  (-0.835)  (-0.098)  (1.600) 
ICMW  0.242**  -0.008  1.454** 
  (1.974)  (-0.116)  (2.407) 
SEC_INVESTIG  0.343**  -0.012  -0.304 
  (2.168)  (-0.125)  (-0.427) 
       
Firm and CTR Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Controls  Yes  No  No 
Year and Quarter   Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Observations  915  915  915 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
 
(continued on next page)  
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TABLE 18 (continued) 
 
Panel B:  Association between number of comment letters received and CTR approvals 
 
  MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
 PROTECTION 
PERIOD 
 
SUCCESS 
       
#COMMENT  -0.007  -0.020  0.217 
  (-0.089)  (-0.437)  (0.747) 
Section 408 Measures       
PE_RATIO   0.018**  0.000  -0.064** 
  (2.460)  (0.078)  (-2.368) 
HIGH_MVE  -0.343**  0.241**  0.585 
  (-2.319)  (2.560)  (0.626) 
MERGER  0.242**  -0.098*  -0.174 
  (2.171)  (-1.783)  (-0.493) 
Proprietary Costs       
RD  -0.004  -0.011  0.051 
  (-0.163)  (-0.814)  (0.720) 
LOG_FIRMS  0.032  -0.034*  -0.132 
  (0.928)  (-1.819)  (-1.204) 
SEGMENTS  -0.056  -0.061  -0.108 
  (-0.828)  (-1.632)  (-0.448) 
IND_ROA  0.012*  -0.003  0.047** 
  (1.715)  (-0.569)  (2.289) 
IND_RD  0.110  0.428***  0.691 
  (0.480)  (3.272)  (0.655) 
IND_CAPX  -0.651  2.829***  -3.508 
  (-0.470)  (3.797)  (-0.657) 
Red Flags       
RESTATEMENT  -0.088  -0.004  0.537 
  (-0.733)  (-0.067)  (1.420) 
ICMW  0.235*  -0.005  1.423** 
  (1.903)  (-0.067)  (2.439) 
SEC_INVESTIG  0.351**  -0.015  -0.346 
  (2.203)  (-0.146)  (-0.501) 
       
Firm and CTR Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Controls  Yes  No  No 
Year and Quarter   Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Observations  915  915  915 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. 
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Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industry Analysis 
 I conduct a separate analysis of CTR approval decisions in pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industry firms in order to examine the role of SOX 408 measures and red 
flags in an industry with high proprietary costs due to the important role of intellectual 
property in this industry.  This analysis also addresses concerns that proprietary costs do 
not appear to influence CTR approval decisions because empirical measures of 
proprietary costs do not align well with firms’ views of proprietary costs by examining a 
single industry commonly viewed as bearing high proprietary costs.   
Table 19, Panel A presents univariate differences between redacting and non-
redacting firms in pharmaceuticals.  Pharmaceutical firms that redact have higher rates 
of issuing equity (EQUITY_ISSUE, p<0.01), are more likely to report a loss (LOSS, 
p<0.01), are larger measured using total assets (LOG_ASSETS, p<0.01), file more 
material contracts (#CONTRACTS, p<0.01), are more likely to report pension assets and 
liabilities (PENSION, p<0.05), are more likely to retain a Big N auditor (BIGN, p<0.01) 
and have higher analyst following (#FOLLOWING, p<0.01).   
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TABLE 19 
Analysis of firms’ redaction decisions and the SEC’s approval decisions among 
pharmaceutical firms 
 
Panel A:  Univariate comparison of redacting and non-redacting firms in the 
pharmaceutical industry 
 
 
 REDACT=1 
 
 REDACT=0 
 
 T Stat
 
 
 n=185 
 
 n=327 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 EQUITY_ISSUE 
 
 0.10 
 
 0.02 
 
 3.87 
 
DEBT_ISSUE 
 0.27 
 
 0.31 
 
 0.92 
 
ROA
 
 -0.62 
 
 -0.89 
 
 1.67 
 
LOSS
 
 0.85 
 
 0.74 
 
 2.93 
 
LOG_ASSETS 
 
 4.56 
 
 3.89 
 
 3.10 
 
# CONTRACTS 
 
 37.26 
 
 29.59 
 
 5.54 
 
SEGMENTS 
 
 1.23 
 
 1.25 
 
 0.21 
 
FOREIGN_OP
 
 0.15 
 
 0.15 
 
 0.04 
 
PENSION 
 
 0.62 
 
 0.52 
 
 2.11 
 
BIGN 
 
 0.74 
 
 0.57 
 
 4.03 
 
#FOLLOWING 
 
 5.28 
 
 2.70 
 
 5.15 
 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. 
(continued on the next page) 
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TABLE 19 (continued) 
 
Panel B:  CTR approval decisions among only firms in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals 
industries 
  MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
 PROTECTION 
PERIOD 
 
SUCCESS 
       
Section 408 Measures       
PE_RATIO   -0.073  0.003  -0.036 
  (-0.990)  (0.102)  (-0.093) 
HIGH_MVE  -0.424  0.259  a 
  (-1.581)  (1.556)   
Proprietary Costs       
SEGMENTS  -0.125  -0.100*  -0.368 
  (-1.005)  (-1.687)  (-0.428) 
Red Flags       
RESTATEMENT  -0.278  0.051  2.479* 
  (-1.432)  (0.564)  (1.847) 
ICMW  0.547**  0.122  -1.111 
  (2.175)  (0.911)  (-0.665) 
SEC_INVESTIG  0.289  -0.199  -0.139 
  (0.947)  (-1.023)  (-0.066) 
       
Firm and CTR Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year and Quarter Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Observations  311  311  299 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
a  Variable dropped as a perfect predictor of success 
Standard errors are clustered by firm 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
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Table 19, Panel B presents regression results for duration to approval and the 
outcome of CTR decisions for firms in the pharmaceutical industry.  The sample size for 
this test is reduced to 311 observations.  I estimate Models 1-3 without industry 
measures of proprietary costs (IND_ROA, IND_RD, IND_CAPX, LOG_FIRMS).  The 
coefficient for material weaknesses is positive and significant (ICMW, p<0.05) in the 
negative binomial regression, indicating that pharmaceutical firms reporting material 
weaknesses incur longer duration to approval than pharmaceuticals firms that did not 
disclose a material weakness.  In Model 2 examining the protection period, the 
coefficient for SEGMENTS remains negative and significant (p<0.10), suggesting that 
pharmaceutical firms reporting more operating segments may make weaker claims of 
proprietary costs.  In the logistic regression examining the probability of successful 
redaction, the coefficient for restatements is positive and significant (RESTATEMENT, 
p<0.10), indicating that pharmaceuticals firms reporting a financial restatement have 
higher odds of success.  These findings generally are consistent with the main analysis 
concluding that red flags influence the SEC’s decisions to apply scrutiny to requests for 
disclosure exemptions. 
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Discretionary Accruals and Unexpected Audit Fees as Measures of the Public Interest 
in Promoting Disclosure 
I examine whether discretionary accruals and unexpected audit fees, are 
associated with the SEC’s CTR decisions.  While I do not propose that the SEC 
implements these measures in the regulatory decision-making process, these measures 
may be correlated with other factors the SEC considers when reviewing CTRs.  I 
calculate discretionary accruals (DISC_ACCR) as the residual from the Jones (1991) 
model as modified by Dechow et al. (1995).  In addition, I include an indicator variable 
for negative cash flows from operations (Ball and Shivakumar 2006) and measure total 
accruals as the difference between earnings and cash flows.  Next, I examine unexpected 
audit fees to capture the fee component that is not explained by firm fundamentals; i.e. 
the auditor’s risk premium based on their private information of the client’s underlying 
accounting quality.  Hribar et al. (2009) argue that unexpected audit fees provide a 
measure of accounting quality that incorporates auditors’ private information, that 
provides a broader measure of financial statement quality, and that is less confounded by 
firm fundamentals than other measures of earnings quality.  I follow Hribar et al. (2009) 
in calculating unexpected audit fees (UNEXPECTED_FEES).  Both discretionary 
accruals and unexpected audit fees are measured as of the annual report coinciding with 
the CTR or the annual report preceding the CTR for CTRs requested for quarterly or 
timely reports.  
 92 
TABLE 20 
 
Association between CTR decisions and discretionary accruals 
Panel A:  Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
5% 
 
25% 
 
50% 
 
75% 
 
95% 
DISC_ACCR 900 
 
-0.14 
 
0.93 
 
-1.25 
 
-0.48 
 
-0.15 
 
0.07 
 
0.82 
ABS_DISC_ACCR 900 
 
0.53 
 
0.78 
 
0.02 
 
0.11 
 
0.28 
 
0.65 
 
1.46 
UNEXPECTED_FEES 865 
 
0.06 
 
0.54 
 
-0.79 
 
-0.30 
 
0.03 
 
0.39 
 
1.03 
 
Panel B:  Discretionary accruals and unexpected audit fees in duration to approval 
 
  MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
 MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
 MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
       
DISC_ACCR  -0.105**     
  (-2.341)     
ABS_DISC_ACCR    -0.061   
    (-1.217)   
UNEXPECTED_FEES      0.119 
      (1.341) 
SOX 408 Measure       
PE_RATIO  0.020***  0.020***  0.019** 
  (2.738)  (2.726)  (2.401) 
HIGH_MVE  -0.245*  -0.241*  -0.267 
  (-1.678)  (-1.645)  (-1.513) 
Proprietary Costs       
RD  -0.007  -0.008  -0.001 
  (-0.357)  (-0.377)  (-0.041) 
LOG_FIRMS  0.061  0.051  0.031 
  (1.544)  (1.313)  (0.733) 
SEGMENTS  -0.053  -0.054  -0.022 
  (-0.733)  (-0.745)  (-0.284) 
IND_ROA  0.009  0.008  0.011 
  (1.061)  (0.967)  (1.198) 
IND_RD  -0.035  -0.066  0.077 
  (-0.149)  (-0.280)  (0.315) 
IND_CAPX  -1.551  -1.882  -1.003 
  (-1.037)  (-1.249)  (-0.676) 
Red Flags       
RESTATEMENT  -0.018  -0.017  -0.038 
  (-0.154)  (-0.136)  (-0.291) 
ICMW  0.275**  0.264**  0.091 
  (2.230)  (2.115)  (0.679) 
SEC_INVESTIG  0.275  0.276  0.233 
  (1.608)  (1.614)  (1.486) 
Firm and CTR Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year and Quarter Indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  863  863  816 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 20 (continued) 
 
Panel C:  Association between discretionary accruals and unexpected fees on the protection 
period 
 
 PROTECTION 
PERIOD 
PROTECTION 
PERIOD 
PROTECTION 
PERIOD 
    
DISC_ACCR -0.024   
 (-0.920)   
ABS_DISC_ACCR  0.013  
  (0.455)  
UNEXPECTED_FEES   -0.040 
   (-0.823) 
    
SOX 408 Measures Yes Yes Yes 
Proprietary Costs Yes Yes Yes 
Red Flags Yes Yes Yes 
Firm and CTR Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Quarter Indicators Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 863 863 816 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
  
 
Panel D:  Association between discretionary accruals and unexpected fees on probability of 
successful redaction 
 
 SUCCESS SUCCESS SUCCESS 
    
DISC_ACCR 0.327*   
 (1.796)   
ABS_DISC_ACCR  0.196  
  (1.014)  
UNEXPECTED_FEES   -0.323 
   (-0.863) 
    
SOX 408 Measures Yes Yes Yes 
Proprietary Costs Yes Yes Yes 
Red Flags Yes Yes Yes 
Firm and CTR Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Quarter Indicators Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 863 863 816 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
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Table 20 reports the results of estimating Model 1 examining duration to 
approval including disrectionary accruals, the absolute value of discretionary accruals, 
and unexpected audit fees.  The coefficient on DISC_ACCR is negative and significant 
(p<0.05), suggesting that firms with more positive discretionary accruals receive faster 
approval.  ABS_DISC_ACCR and UNEXPECTED_FEES are not associated with 
duration to approval.  In Table 20, Panel B, the coefficients for DISC_ACCR and 
UNEXPECTED_FEES are insignificant when regressed on protection period, consistent 
with the protection period reflecting primarily the competitive harm to proprietary 
disclosures.  Table 20, Panel C presents coefficient estimates for DISC_ACCR and 
UNEXPECTED_FEES on the probability of successful redaction.  The coefficient on 
DISC_ACCR is marginally positive and significant, suggesting that firms with more 
positive discretionary accruals have higher odds of success.  The coefficients for 
ABS_DISC_ACCR and UNEXPECTED_FEES are not significant, suggesting no 
association with the odds of success.  
Analysis of the Report Issued by the SEC’s Office of the Inspector General 
 Following the January 2010 Congressional hearing on AIG’s bailout, the SEC’s 
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated an audit of the processes and procedures 
for reviewing confidential treatment requests within the Division of Corporate Finance 
(SEC 2010).  OIG’s report, released on September 28, 2010, details the confidential 
treatment process during the 2008-2009 time periods.  OIG reported four audit findings 
and documents policies and procedures that are consistent with, and strengthen the 
validity of, the empirical analysis in this paper.  The following sections summarize the 
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findings and recommendations from the OIG report and analyze these findings within 
the context of the preceding empirical analysis. 
Discussion of Finding 1 Pertaining to Policies for Reviewing CTRs  
Finding 1 concludes that the Division of Corporate Finance’s policies “do not 
provide for in-depth, substantive reviews of most confidential treatment requests” 
because a high percentage of CTRs are approved without seeking additional information 
from firms prior to approval.  This outcome may increase the risk that the SEC will 
approve redaction of material information.   
When the SEC receives CTRs, research specialists perform initial screenings 
based on company and application specific criteria, and make one of three 
recommendations to the Staff regarding CTR review:  “No review,” “Monitor,” or “Full 
Review.”23  Then, the CTRs are assigned to Staff members who review the requests and 
make decisions to approve the CTRs or issue comments to the registrant.  Staff members 
who approve CTRs generally follow the recommendations made by research 
specialists.
24
  Classifying a CTR in the “No Review” category indicates that the CTR 
likely can be approved without requesting additional information or sending a comment 
letter to the registrant.  This category comprises 68% of CTRs processed by the Division 
of Corporate Finance.  When research specialists recommend “Monitor” status, the Staff 
generally issue comments to the firm on one or more aspects of the application but not 
                                                 
23 
The screening criteria are redacted from the OIG report as being proprietary to the SEC’s regulatory 
process. 
24 
OIG notes (page 11) “We found rare instances when the AD Office did not concur with ODS’s 
recommendation of “No Review,” or conducted any substantive evaluation of the application after such a 
recommendation was made.”   
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on the entire application.  This category comprises 23% of CTRs.  The third category 
consists of CTRs selected for “Full Review” or comments on the entire application.  This 
category comprises less than 10% of CTRs submitted to the Division of Corporate 
Finance.  Overall, OIG concludes that the CTR process increases the risk that firms may 
withhold material information from investors using the confidential treatment process 
due to the high percentage of CTRs approved without correspondence.   
The SEC’s review categorization procedures strengthen the validity of my study.  
First, sorting CTRs into three review categories strengthens inferences from the duration 
analyses associating longer duration with added scrutiny.  Although I cannot distinguish 
among the three groups, CTRs with long duration to approval most likely represent the 
CTRs selected for full review; therefore these CTRs are selected for, and receive, greater 
scrutiny than other CTRs.  In addition, the finding that greater than two-thirds of CTRs 
are approved without comment provides an additional explanation for the findings that 
proprietary costs are not associated with duration to approval.  
OIG Discussion of the Criteria Used to Screen CTRs into Review Categories 
Next, Finding 1 contains a discussion of the criteria used by the SEC to screen 
CTRs.  Although OIG redacted the SEC’s firm and application specific screening 
criteria, my findings provide insight into several firm and application specific criteria 
used to screen CTRs.  Red flag measures such as internal control material weaknesses 
and previous SEC investigations are significant predictors of long review periods, 
suggesting that these variables are predictors of “Monitor” or “Full Review” 
recommendations.  In addition, several variables that predict lower odds of successful 
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redaction also provide insight into the firm and application specific criteria used to 
screen CTRs because applications selected for “No Review” are unlikely to result in un-
redaction.   Foreign filers have lower odds of success and the odds of success are 
decreasing as the number of exhibits redacted per application increases.  In addition, 
firms in less concentrated industries have lower odds of success.  These findings suggest 
that these variables are correlated with the SEC’s proprietary screening criteria. 
I also investigate other factors the SEC may consider in its proprietary screening 
criteria.  First, CTRs are considered part of the financial statement review and comment 
letter process while a firm is under periodic review by the SEC in accordance with the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  For this reason, CTRs submitted by firms whose financial 
statements are under review may be assigned to the “Monitor” or “Full Review” 
category.  I include an indicator variable equal to one if comment letter documents 
(documents labeled CORRESP or UPLOAD) are posted in EDGAR within three months 
prior to and months three subsequent to the CTR application (COMMENT).
25
  I also 
control for mergers and acquisitions during the year the CTR is requested (MERGER) 
because these events are likely to trigger a review.   
Finally, I control for other factors that the SEC may consider when screening and 
categorizing CTRs for review.  I include an indicator variable equal to one if the firm 
received a going concern opinion in the most recent annual report (GOING_CONCERN) 
and equal to zero otherwise.  Last, I include the natural logarithm of firm age 
(FIRM_AGE) measured as the number of years the firm is reported in CRSP to capture  
                                                 
25 
I require correspondence both before and after the CTR is submitted to ensure that the firm is under 
review at the time the CTR is submitted. 
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TABLE 21 
 
Additional criteria correlated with CTR approval decisions 
Panel A:  Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
5% 
 
25% 
 
50% 
 
75% 
 
95% 
COMMENT 998 
 
0.360 
 
0.480 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
MERGER 998 
 
0.265 
 
0.441 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
FIRM_AGE 998 
 
2.389 
 
0.682 
 
1.386 
 
1.792 
 
2.398 
 
2.89 
 
3.555 
GOING_CONCERN 998 
 
0.062 
 
0.242 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
 
Panel B:  Multivariate analysis examining additional criteria associated with CTR 
approval decisions  
 
MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
    
COMMENT 0.058   
 (0.615)   
GOING_CONCERN -0.340** -0.290* 
  (-1.989) (-1.736) 
FIRM_AGE 0.158** 0.121 
  (2.224) (1.613) 
MERGER  0.203* 0.207* 
  (1.807) (1.877) 
SOX 408 Criteria   
PE_RATIO  0.018** 0.017** 
  (2.193) (2.289) 
HIGH_MVE  -0.341* -0.295* 
  (-1.830) (-1.735) 
Red Flags    
RESTATEMENT   -0.099 
   (-0.870) 
ICMW   0.209* 
   (1.722) 
SEC_INVESTIG  0.336** 
   (2.044) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 998 940 940 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
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emerging companies.  Table 21, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for these 
variables.  The mean number of sample firms under comment letter review equals 0.36.  
This statistic is consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley requirement for the SEC to review 
firms’ financial statements at least once every three years.  The mean number of merger 
or acquisition transaction in the sample equals 0.265.  The mean and median firm age in 
the sample equals 11 years and six percent of firms received a going concern opinion in 
the most recent annual report.      
Table 21, Panel B presents coefficient estimates for these additional criteria on 
MONTHS_TO_APPROVAL.  I find that comment letter review is not associated with 
MONTHS_TO_APPROVAL.  The coefficient for MERGER is positive and significant 
(p<0.10), suggesting that merger transactions are associated with marginally longer 
duration to approval.  Likewise, the coefficient for FIRM_AGE is positive and 
significant (p<0.10) indicating longer duration to approval. The coefficient for 
GOING_CONCERN is negative and significant (p<0.05), indicating that distressed firms 
have significantly shorter duration to approval.  Overall, these findings suggest 
additional insight into the criteria used by the SEC in sorting CTRs into review 
categories and are consistent with red flags triggering a more stringent level of review.     
Discussion of Finding 2 Pertaining to the Language Used in Firms’ CTR Requests 
 Finding 2 concerns the use by firms of “overly broad” language, boilerplate 
language, and “conclusory” [sic] statements in CTRs.   OIG observed several approved 
CTRs that used overly broad language to support claims of competitive harm and noted 
boilerplate language across many applications.  In addition, OIG concluded that the 
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screening process encouraged the use of boilerplate language and suggests that 
boilerplate language may increase the probability of receiving a “No Review” 
recommendation.  The primary concern underlying this finding is that firms may 
improperly receive CTR approval without adequate justification for the merits of the 
application.  This finding does not impact the preceding analysis because the language 
and text of CTRs is not publically observable.  Further, overly broad and boilerplate 
language does not necessarily indicate redaction of material information: firms with 
strong merits may tailor their applications to facilitate approval. 
Discussion of Finding 3 Pertaining to CTR Review Outside the Reviewer’s Industry 
Expertise 
Finding 3 concerns the assignment of CTRs to reviewers within the Disclosure 
Operations segment of the Division of Corporate Finance.  Disclosure Operations is 
organized by industry group and the staff members within these groups are familiar with 
industry specific accounting and disclosure matters.  OIG found that “a significant  
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number” of CTRs are assigned to Staff members with expertise outside the firm’s 
industry, and that such assignments increase the risk of incorrectly granting confidential 
treatment.  OIG notes that review by non-experts is more common among biotech and 
pharmaceuticals firms due to the high volume of requests from firms in these industries, 
and recommends that Staff in other industries be trained to review CTRs for biotech and 
pharmaceuticals firms.   
This finding suggests that CTRs reviewed by Staff with expertise in other 
industries may be reviewed more quickly and may have higher probabilities of success 
because the reviewer lacks the expertise to evaluate firms’ applications.  Alternately, 
CTRs categorized into “Monitor” and “Full Review” categorizes may be more likely 
directed to industry experts and CTRs categorized as “No Review” may be directed to 
outside of the industry group, producing the same fact pattern.  To evaluate the 
implications of Finding 3 on my analysis, I first identify Staff members who are likely to 
be industry experts and those who may possibly “rubber stamp” CTRs and perform two 
tests to examine the determinants of expert review and the effect of expert review and 
potentially “rubber stamp” review on CTR approval decisions.    
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TABLE 22 
 
Industry distribution of CTR signers 
 
 SEC Industry Office 
Signe
r ID  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total 
Approved 
by Signer 
2     100       6 
     7.5        
3   100         17 
   13.49          
4 41.6
7 
33.3
3 
8.33  8.33     8.33  12 
 1.29 5.8 0.79  1.25     0.61   
5 47.9
5 
 1.37  1.37 1.37 26.03  2.74 19.18  73 
 9  0.79  1.25 1.43 86.36  4.35 8.59   
6 29.8
5 
2.99  2.99  58.21    5.97  67 
 5.14 2.9  7.41  55.71    2.45   
7 98.0
8 
       1.92   52 
 13.1
1 
       2.17    
8 4.76         95.24  21 
 0.26         12.27   
9 3.23  85.48  3.23 1.61 1.61   3.23 1.61 62 
 0.51  42.06  2.5 1.43 4.55   1.23 0.95  
10 16.8
5 
57.3 11.24 2.25  4.49  1.12  5.62 1.12 89 
 3.86 73.9
1 
7.94 7.41  5.71  5.56  3.07 0.95  
11 5  5       80 10 20 
  0.26  0.79       9.82 1.9  
12 92.8
6 
        7.14  14 
  3.34         0.61   
14 50  10     20  20  10 
  1.29  0.79     11.11  1.23   
15 10  4   1   2 3 80 100 
  2.57  3.17   1.43   4.35 1.84 76.19  
16 20.6
9 
6.9 6.9  17.24 10.34   3.45 24.14 10.34 29 
  1.54 2.9 1.59  6.25 4.29   2.17 4.29 2.86  
17 50     50      4 
  0.51     2.86       
18 42.8
6 
42.8
6 
       14.29  7 
  0.77 4.35        0.61   
19   80       20  5 
    3.17       0.61   
20 3.33  86.67       6.67 3.33 30 
  0.26  20.63       1.23 0.95  
21 100           17 
  4.37            
22        60  40  5 
         16.67  1.23   
23   50  50       2 
    0.79  1.25        
24 36.3
6 
    63.64      11 
  1.03     10       
25 42.8
6 
2.04   1.02 1.02   36.73 15.31 1.02 98 
  10.8 2.9   1.25 1.43   78.26 9.2 0.95  
26 52.3
5 
3.36 2.68 0.67 10.07 4.03   1.34 14.77 10.74 149 
  20.0
5 
7.25 3.17 3.7 18.75 8.57   4.35 13.5 15.24  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 22 (continued) 
 
 SEC Industry Office 
Signer ID  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total 
Approved 
by Signer 
27 26.67         73.33  15 
  1.03         6.75   
28 11.11    11.11     77.78  9 
  0.26    1.25     4.29   
29 4.17    91.67  4.17     48 
  0.51    55  9.09      
30 20    10     70  10 
  0.51    1.25     4.29   
31 49.06  1.89  3.77 1.89  20.75  22.64  53 
  6.68  0.79  2.5 1.43  61.11  7.36   
32 90        10   10 
  2.31        2.17    
33 48.57   31.43  5.71  1.43 1.43 11.43  70 
  8.74   81.48  5.71  5.56 2.17 4.91   
Total 
CTRs 
Approved  
389 69 126 27 80 70 22 18 46 163 105 1,115 
Percentage 
of Total 
CTRs 
Approved 
34.89 6.19 11.3 2.42 7.17 6.28 1.97 1.61 4.13 14.62 9.42 100 
 
The first row for each signer consists of the percentage of CTRs signed by the Staff member per industry/office (row 
percentage).  The second row for each signer consists of the percentage of CTRs in the industry office signed by that 
Staff member (column percentage).  Bold indicates probable classification of the signer as an expert in the industry 
office based on row or column percentages. 
Office industry affiliation: 
1. Health Care and Insurance 
2. Consumer Products 
3. Computers and Online Services 
4. Natural Resources and Food 
5. Structured Finance 
6. Manufacturing and Construction 
7. Financial Services 
8. Real Estate and Business Services 
9. Beverages, Apparel, and Health Care Services 
10. Electronics and Machinery 
11. Telecommunications 
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To identify industry experts, I assign each firm to an industry office based on the 
SEC’s list of industry offices by SIC code.  I classify a Staff member as an industry 
expert if 70% or more of the CTRs approved by the Staff member belong to the same 
industry office.  I also classify the Staff member as an expert if they individually signed 
greater than 50% of the CTRs in an industry office.  I require the Staff member to have 
signed more than 10 CTRs during the 18 month period of my study to exclude 
individuals who do not regularly review CTRs.  See Table 22 for a frequency table 
reporting the percentage of CTRs approved by individual for firms assigned to the 11 
SEC industry offices.    
I set an indicator variable equal to one if the CTR was approved by a Staff 
member designated as an industry expert following the procedure listed above 
(EXPERT) and equal to zero otherwise.   I also partition Staff members as experts in 
SEC Offices 1 or 10 (Healthcare including pharmaceuticals and Electronics/Machinery 
respectively) versus experts in other industries because CTRs from firms in Offices 1 
and 10 may be reviewed more commonly outside the industry office than CTRs from 
other firms.  For this reason, my classification procedure may misclassify an individual 
as an expert in pharmaceuticals or manufacturing if they approve numerous CTRs 
outside their industry group.  To address this concern, I create an indicator variable equal 
to one if the Staff member is an expert in Office 1 or 10, and equal to zero otherwise 
(PHARM_EXPERT).  I also create an indicator variable equal to one for Staff members 
who are experts in industries 2-9 or industry 11 (OTHER_EXPERT).   
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TABLE 23 
 
Logistic regression examining determinants of industry expert review 
 
      
 
EXPERT 
 OTHER 
EXPERT 
 PHARM 
EXPERT 
      
Additional Criteria      
RESTATEMENT 0.392**  0.427  0.536* 
 (2.066)  (1.488)  (1.868) 
COMMENT_LETTER 0.527***  0.229  0.978*** 
 (2.950)  (0.835)  (3.510) 
FIRM_AGE -0.219  0.057  -0.589** 
 (-1.464)  (0.281)  (-2.377) 
GOING_CONCERN 0.326  0.253  0.212 
 (0.728)  (0.291)  (0.386) 
MERGER -0.050  0.001  -0.119 
 (-0.242)  (0.002)  (-0.317) 
Section 408 Measures       
PE_RATIO 0.018*  0.037  -0.013 
 (1.693)  (1.547)  (-0.945) 
HIGH MVE -0.983**  0.110  -1.818** 
 (-2.276)  (0.176)  (-2.269) 
Proprietary Costs      
LONG_PROTECTION_PERIOD -0.276  -0.231  -0.144 
 (-1.425)  (-0.816)  (-0.514) 
RD -0.026  0.064  -0.056 
 (-0.733)  (0.570)  (-1.255) 
LOG_FIRMS 0.154**  -0.003  0.056 
 (2.282)  (-0.044)  (0.339) 
SEGMENTS 0.158  -0.261  0.459** 
 (1.135)  (-1.186)  (2.125) 
IND_ROA -0.023  -0.004  -0.262 
 (-1.095)  (-0.202)  (-1.048) 
IND_RD -2.013***  1.315  -0.718 
 (-3.728)  (0.940)  (-0.768) 
IND_CAPX 4.498  3.366  -6.522 
 (1.385)  (0.919)  (-0.591) 
      
Firm and CTR Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
Constant -0.958  0.386  -0.627 
 (-1.173)  (0.353)  (-0.377) 
Observations 940  451  489 
ROC 0.784  0.742  0.737 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
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  To determine the potential affect of industry expert review on CTR decisions, I 
first examine whether firm and CTR characteristics explain whether CTRs are assigned 
to individuals within the firm’s industry office or to staff members without industry 
expertise.  Then, I examine whether approval by an industry expert affects CTR 
decisions.  OIG’s report suggests that Staff members outside the firm’s industry 
expertise may be more likely to approve redaction of material information due to 
unfamiliarity with the industry.  If the SEC assigns CTRs recommended for “Monitor” 
or “Full Review” to experts and CTRs recommended for “No Review” to available staff 
members, then I expect (a) the determinants of CTR review to predict approval by an 
industry expert and (b) that approval by an industry expert is associated with longer 
duration to approval and lower odds of success.  Alternately, if CTR assignments are 
made based on individuals’ work-load or on a haphazard basis, I expect (a) no 
association between firm and CTR characteristics and expert review and (b) expert 
review to be associated with longer-duration to approval and lower odds of success.    
Table 23 reports coefficient estimates for three logistic regressions where the 
dependent variables equal EXPERT, PHARM_EXPERT, and OTHER_EXPERT.  I 
include firm controls, proprietary costs, and the SOX Section 408 monitoring criteria in 
this regression.  In column 1, I find positive and significant coefficients on 
RESTATEMENT (p<0.05), COMMENT (p<0.01), PE_RATIO (p<0.10), indicating that 
these variables are associated with higher odds of expert review.  I find negative and 
significant coefficients on FORM_8K, LOG_FIRMS, and IND_RD, indicating that these 
variables are associated with lower odds of industry expert review.  In columns 2 and 3, 
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I find that the SOX Section 408 criteria, proprietary costs, and other criteria predict 
industry expert review only in Office 1 and 10 and not in other industry offices.  This 
finding provides additional evidence that these variables are used as screening criteria 
because the supply of expert reviewers in Offices 1 and 10 is limited due to the high 
volume of requests from firms in this industry, whereas the supply of reviewers in other 
industries is generally adequate to provide expert review to all CTRs.   
Table 24 presents regression analysis examining CTR decisions with SEC 
reviewer expertise included as an independent variable.  The coefficients for both 
PHARM_EXPERT (p<0.01) and OTHER_EXPERT (p<0.01) are positive and significant 
in the negative binomial regression on MONTHS_TO_APPROVAL, indicating that 
disclosure operations assigns CTRs to expert reviewers when greater scrutiny is 
required.  The coefficient for OTHER_EXPERT is negative and significant (p<0.01) in 
Model 2 examining the protection period.  This finding is consistent with industry 
experts applying greater scrutiny to claims of competitive harm.  Finally, I find no 
association between expert review and the probability of success, indicating that industry 
experts are no more or less likely to reject applications.  I find that the inferences for the 
SOX 408 measures, proprietary costs and red flags remain consistent when controlling 
for expert review.   
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TABLE 24 
 
Effect of expert review on CTR decisions 
 
  MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
 PROTECTION 
PERIOD 
 SUCCESS 
       
PHARM_EXPERT   0.466***  -0.044  0.637 
  (4.276)  (-0.654)  (1.074) 
OTHER_EXPERT   0.362***  -0.175***  -0.416 
  (3.231)  (-2.950)  (-1.106) 
Section 408 Measures       
PE_RATIO  0.018**  0.001  -0.058** 
  (2.410)  (0.219)  (-2.063) 
HIGH_MVE  -0.243*  0.208**  0.627 
  (-1.822)  (2.241)  (0.643) 
Proprietary Costs       
RD   -0.002  -0.010  0.081 
  (-0.084)  (-0.754)  (1.104) 
LOG_FIRMS  0.040  -0.032*  -0.127 
  (1.201)  (-1.783)  (-1.159) 
SEGMENTS  -0.075  -0.065*  -0.105 
  (-1.147)  (-1.792)  (-0.425) 
IND_ROA  0.011  -0.003  0.033 
  (1.375)  (-0.710)  (1.037) 
IND_RD  0.250  0.342***  0.527 
  (1.133)  (2.627)  (0.508) 
IND_CAPX  -1.235  3.190***  -0.709 
  (-0.878)  (4.210)  (-0.135) 
Red Flags       
RESTATEMENT  -0.113  0.006  0.600* 
  (-0.947)  (0.104)  (1.718) 
ICMW  0.208*  0.005  1.117** 
  (1.692)  (0.070)  (2.017) 
SEC_INVESTIG  0.308*  -0.017  -0.259 
  (1.939)  (-0.172)  (-0.399) 
       
Firm and CTR Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year and Quarter   Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Observations  939  939  939 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
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Finally, to identify the potential for “rubber stamping” as suggested in the OIG 
report, I examine the volume, industry distribution, and approval metrics for individual 
staff members in the Division of Corporate Finance. With 33 staff members reviewing 
approximately 1,000 CTRs in my sample, I expect that the average staff member signed 
approximately 35 CTRs.  I consider any individual that signed 70 or more CTRs to have 
a high volume of approvals during the sample period.  I identify 5 staff members that 
meet these criteria.  Next, I examine the industry distribution of approved CTRs by 
individual and expect that individuals who receive CTRs to “rubber stamp” will approve 
CTRs in several industry offices.  I identify five Staff members that meet both criteria.  I 
examine the mean months-to-approval and % successful approvals for these five Staff 
members.  I expect that if these reviewers “rubber stamp” CTRs, they approve CTRs 
more quickly and with higher rates of success for firms outside the Staff member’s 
industry assignment.   
I classify Staff members 10, 25, and 26 as potentially “rubber stamping” CTRs 
because they review CTRs more quickly for CTRs outside their industry expertise and 
because they approve CTRs with higher rates of successful redaction among firms 
outside their industry than within their industry.  I create an indicator variable equal to 
one if the CTR was approved by one of these three individuals and if the firm was not 
assigned to the reviewer’s industry office (RUBBERSTAMP).  These metrics are 
presented in Table 25.    
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I examine the firm and industry characteristics of CTRs that may increase the 
odds of being “rubber stamped.”  I estimate a logistic regression with the dependent 
variable equal to one if the CTR is potentially “rubber stamped.”  I include red flags, 
SOX 408 monitoring criteria, COMMENT, proprietary costs, firm and CTR controls, and 
year and quarter fixed effects.  Table 25, Panel B presents the results of this analysis.  
The coefficients for red flags are negative and significant (RESTATEMENT, p<0.01; 
ICMW, p<0.10; SEC_INVESTIG, p<0.01), consistent with the SEC assigning greater risk 
and therefore requiring greater scrutiny of these applications.  In addition, the coefficient 
for firms in biotech and pharmaceuticals industries is positive and significant (p<0.01), 
indicating that CTRs are more likely to be potentially “rubber stamped” in this industry.  
Finally, Table 25, Panel C presents coefficient estimates for RUBBERSTAMP and red 
flags measures on duration to approval and the probability of successful redaction.  The 
coefficient estimate for RUBBERSTAMP in the negative binomial regression on 
MONTHS_TO_APPROVAL is negative and significant (p<0.01) and is positive and 
significant in the logistic regression examining the odds of successful redaction 
(p<0.01), indicating that potentially “rubber stamped” CTRs are approved significantly 
faster (p<0.01) and have higher odds of success (p<0.05).  The main inferences 
concerning red flags are consistent with controlling for potential “rubber stamping.”  
These results provide additional support for the notion that the SEC screening process 
assigns more stringent review to red flag firms, including review assignment to industry 
experts.   
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TABLE 25 
 
“Rubber Stamp” CTR approvals 
 
Panel A:  Identification of “rubber stamped” CTRs 
 
  
Approved within industry Approved in other industries 
Signer 
Total 
Approved Obs 
Months to 
Approval 
% 
Successful Obs 
Months to 
Approval 
% 
Successful 
5 80 19 1 100% 61 1.36 93% 
10 94 51 1.09 88% 43 0.67 97% 
15 104 80 1.8 80% 24 0.708 83% 
25 99 36 0.88 89% 63 0.507 98% 
26a 149 78 0.794 97% 71 0.73 98% 
a Signer 26 is not assigned an industry specialization in Panel A due to the broad range of offices over which this 
individual approves CTRs.  For this table, I consider the industry expertise to be Office 1.   
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 25 (continued) 
Panel B:  Determinants of assignment to a rubber stamp approver 
 
 RUBBERSTAMP RUBBERSTAMP RUBBERSTAMP RUBBERSTAMP 
RESTATEMENT -0.705***   -0.499** 
 (-3.393)   (-2.213) 
ICMW  -0.446*  -0.076 
  (-1.654)  (-0.257) 
SEC_INVESTIG  -1.205*** -0.836* 
   (-2.953) (-1.913) 
HIGH MVE 0.541 0.521 0.610 0.516 
 (1.368) (1.326) (1.494) (1.290) 
PE_RATIO -0.018** -0.018** -0.018** -0.018** 
 (-2.301) (-2.199) (-2.323) (-2.315) 
COMMENT  -0.008 -0.017 -0.028 -0.001 
 (-0.043) (-0.088) (-0.146) (-0.007) 
PHARMA  1.093*** 1.069*** 1.104*** 1.118*** 
 (4.749) (4.667) (4.658) (4.749) 
FIRM_AGE 0.054 0.048 0.086 0.097 
 (0.335) (0.301) (0.530) (0.598) 
MERGER 0.254 0.215 0.230 0.251 
 (1.055) (0.905) (0.954) (1.036) 
GOING_CONCERN -0.727 -0.768 -0.856* -0.812* 
 (-1.470) (-1.551) (-1.726) (-1.651) 
     
Proprietary Costs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm and CTR  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Quarter  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 949 949 949 949 
ROC 0.769 0.762 0.767 0.771 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 25 (continued) 
Panel C:  Coefficient estimates for rubber stamped CTRs and red flags on duration to 
approval and the odds of successful redaction.   
 
 MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
MONTHS TO 
APPROVAL 
SUCCESS SUCCESS 
     
RUBBERSTAMP -0.951*** -0.935*** 1.392** 1.540** 
 (-8.831) (-8.679) (2.130) (2.293) 
RESTATEMENT  -0.155  0.840** 
  (-1.386)  (2.373) 
ICMW  0.228**  0.980* 
  (1.996)  (1.892) 
SEC_INVESTIG  0.323**  -0.221 
  (2.072)  (-0.366) 
     
Proprietary Costs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm and CTR Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Controls Yes Yes No No 
Year and Quarter Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 998 998 998 998 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm 
See Appendix C for variable definitions 
  
 
 
Discussion of Finding 4 Concerning Application Controls in the CTR Database 
Finding 4 in the OIG report concerns application control weaknesses in the 
Microsoft Access database used by the Division of Corporate Finance to track CTRs.  
This finding does not affect the inferences of my study. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 I examine the SEC’s decisions to approve requests for confidential treatment of 
proprietary information in material contract filings.  The confidential treatment process 
requires the SEC to balance the public interest in protecting proprietary information with 
the public interest in promoting disclosures to investors.  I draw upon the economic and 
political science literatures on regulatory decision-making to test the strength of these 
interests on the duration and outcome of the SEC’s decisions.  I find that the public 
interests in promoting disclosure and protecting proprietary information influence 
different aspects of the SEC’s decisions to grant regulatory exemptions.  I also find that 
the SEC applies greater scrutiny to firms exhibiting red flag measures although these 
firms have higher odds of full approval.  This pattern is consistent with the SEC 
reviewing CTRs to avoid legislative oversight and with firms applying for CTRs only 
when they meet the eligibility criteria. 
 This study makes several contributions to the literatures on disclosure choice and 
regulatory decisions.  First, this study provides evidence on how securities regulators 
implement disclosure regulations by examining the SEC’s weighting of competing 
public interests when evaluating requests for disclosure exemptions.  These findings also 
contribute to the role of political influence on disclosure policy, as the SEC’s exemption 
decisions are consistent with reducing the threat of legislative oversight because the SEC 
requires more documentation and applies greater scrutiny to applications from firms that 
pose higher political costs to the agency in the future.   
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Next, these findings are relevant to recent concerns that the SEC’s process for 
reviewing other regulatory exemptions, such as No Action Letters and Exemptive 
Orders, is “increasingly difficult and unpredictable” and “a barrier to responsible market 
innovation,” (Katz 2009).  Also, the U.S. Senate directed the SEC in 2002 to institute “a 
consistent practice of prompt review” over exemption requests because regulatory delays 
can provide “significant, and potentially unwarranted, regulatory and economic benefits 
to companies” (U.S. Senate 2002).  Although No Action Letters and Exemptive Orders 
differ from CTRs in many ways, my findings may be useful for understanding the SEC’s 
decisions in other contexts and to firms seeking other types of regulatory exemptions.
26
   
In addition, I contribute to the literature on redaction as a disclosure choice 
(Verrecchia and Weber 2006; Agarwal et al. 2009) by providing evidence on both the 
firm’s decision to redact and the SEC’s decision to approve the redaction.  These 
findings also suggest that securing confidential treatment may be more costly for firms 
with low financial reporting quality in terms of managerial opportunity cost and legal 
fees due to the longer duration to approval.  
Lastly, this study contributes to the literature on the SEC’s resource allocations 
and decision-making.  Recent studies examine the effectiveness of the SEC’s comment 
letter process in improving financial reporting quality (Lei et al. 2010; Chen and 
                                                 
26  
CTRs differ from No Action Letters and Exemptive Orders in three important ways.  First, No Action 
Letters and Exemptive Orders are requested less frequently than CTRs and are requested under several 
different statutes.  The SEC issued 90 No Action Letters in 2009 under 17 different laws and regulations.  
In contrast, the SEC issued over 700 CTRs under the b(4) exemption to the FOIA. Second, some No 
Action Letters and Exemptive Orders set policy and establish legal precedent.   In these cases, the risk of 
incorrect approval/rejection is significantly different than with CTRs.  Third, No Action letters exempt 
firms from compliance with a law or regulation, whereas CTRs exempt firms from disclosure of specific 
information for a period of time.   
 116 
Johnston 2010; Ertimur and Nondorf 2006) and determinants of the decision to issue an 
AAER (Files 2010; Correia 2009).  CTR decisions provide an opportunity to study the 
SEC’s resource allocations from a perspective other than comment letters or AAERs 
because registrants petition the staff for CTR approval.  These findings indicate that, 
during a period of resource constraints, the SEC applied greater scrutiny to firms with 
low financial reporting quality when evaluating requests for regulatory exemptions.   
This study is subject to two main limitations.  First, data availability limits this 
study to a period of less than two years because CTR approvals were not observable 
prior to May 2008.  This horizon precludes studying longer term trends in resource 
allocation, political influence on CTR approval decisions, or variation in CTR requests 
and approvals with the business cycle.  Second, the study takes place during a period of 
heightened political costs due to macro-economic conditions, therefore red flags may 
figure more prominently in the SEC’s decisions during this time period than during 
periods of greater market stability.  Both limitations provide opportunities for future 
study. 
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APPENDIX A 
INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION AS A DETERMINANT OF FIRMS’ REDACTION 
DECISIONS 
This analysis provides construct validity for use of the industry concentration 
measures in the multivariate analysis.   Ali et al. (2009) document that using a Hirfindahl 
Index of industry concentration constructed from Compustat data may lead to incorrect 
inferences.  Instead, they recommend using industry concentration data published by the 
U.S. Census Department.   The Census Department includes private firms in the 
calculation of industry concentration.  I do not use Census Department Hirfindahl Index 
data because Census releases Hirfindahl Indices only for manufacturing firms and my 
sample includes a large number of non-manufacturing firms.  Instead, I construct 
alternate measures of industry concentration using the total firms reported per NAICS 
from the 2007 Economic Census in lieu of a Census H-Index.  Specifically, I construct 
the log number of firms per NAICS per Census and the percentage of firms in an 
industry (per Census) covered in Compustat.   
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Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics on measures of industry concentration in 2007.   
 
 
Obs Mean SD Min  25% 50% 75%  Max   
H_INDEX NAICS 7,470 2,715 2,634 170 684 1,913 3,717 10,000 
H_INDEX SIC4 10,269 1,580 1,892 100 146 912 2,317 10,000 
LOG_FIRMS 6,558 7.998 2.010 2.079 6.492 7.805 9.390 10.100 
%FIRMS 6,557 5.24% 8.80% 0.00% 0.34% 1.49% 3.84% 36.63% 
         NAICS 300000 Manufacturing 
Firms only         
 
Obs Mean SD Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
H_INDEX NAICS 2,685 3,247 2,707 532 1,594 2,049 4,196 10,000 
H_INDEX SIC4 2,689 2,583 2,111 146 1,028 1,958 3,466 10,000 
LOG_FIRMS 2,613 6.374 0.970 2.996 5.826 6.495 6.870 10.101 
%FIRMS 2,613 10% 10% 0% 1% 5% 16% 37% 
H_INDEX  per 2002 
Census 
2,689 723 537 4 350 584 918 2816 
 
Panel B:  Principle Component Analysis of measures of industry concentration.   
 
 
 Firms with all available data  
(n=6,550) 
 
Manufacturing Firms Only 
 (n=2,610) 
 
 Comp 1 Comp 2 
 
Comp 1 Comp 2 
Eigenvalue  1.867 1.458 
 
2.28 1.425 
Proportion Variation  0.466 0.364 
 
0.456 0.285 
 
 
     Component Loadings  Comp 1 Comp 2 
 
Comp 1 Comp 2 
H_INDEX NAICS  0.6455 0.1941 
 
0.5795 0.1430 
H_INDEX SIC4  0.6335 0.1710 
 
0.5324 0.2139 
LOG_FIRMS  -0.4260 0.5851 
 
-0.3220 0.6084 
%FIRMS  -0.0200 -0.7686 
 
-0.5089 -0.1904 
H_INDEX  per 2002 
Census 
 N/A N/A 
 
0.1346 -0.7262 
Bold indicates loading greater than 0.40.   
 
(continued on next page) 
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Panel C:  Replication of Verrecchia and Weber (2006) varying measures of industry 
concentration  
 
 Sign REDACT REDACT
 
REDACT
 
REDACT
 
REDACT
 
       
H_INDEX SIC2 - -0.228**     
  (-2.049)     
H_INDEX NAICS -  -0.226***    
   (-2.685)    
LOG_FIRMS -   -0.102***   
    (-8.689)   
%FIRMS +    2.716***  
     (12.365)  
H_INDEX 2002 Census      -0.000 
      (-0.033) 
EQUITY_ISSUE  0.180* 0.163* 0.214** 0.127 0.436*** 
  (1.890) (1.672) (2.063) (1.208) (3.010) 
DEBT_ISSUE  -0.194*** -0.194*** -0.234*** -0.183*** -0.332*** 
  (-4.487) (-4.424) (-5.029) (-3.890) (-4.901) 
ROA  0.058*** 0.070*** 0.063*** 0.085*** 0.046 
  (2.711) (3.085) (2.679) (3.304) (1.581) 
LOSS  0.476*** 0.478*** 0.455*** 0.368*** 0.623*** 
  (10.088) (9.990) (8.931) (7.012) (8.550) 
LOG_ASSETS  0.012 0.009 0.022* 0.019 0.032* 
  (1.166) (0.809) (1.924) (1.630) (1.830) 
#CONTRACTS  0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.015*** 
  (7.881) (8.026) (7.156) (7.135) (6.907) 
Constant  -1.612*** -1.577*** -0.857*** -1.782*** -1.823*** 
  (-20.935) (-20.423) (-7.461) (-22.625) (-15.211) 
       
Observations  7,047 6,854 6,057 6,057 2,518 
ROC  0.663 0.660 0.691 0.705 0.705 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 based on two tailed tests.   
T statistics are presented in parentheses.   
All variables are measured as of the end of 2007 except the 2002 Census H-Index.   
Variable definitions are reported in Appendix C. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
EXAMPLE OF CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUEST WITH PARTIAL  
 
UN-REDACTION 
 
 
 UNITED STATES  
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION  
August 27, 2009  
ORDER GRANTING CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT  
UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934  
 
Dyax Corp.  
 
File No. 0-24537 - CF#23538  
_____________________  
 
Dyax Corp. submitted an application under Rule 24b-2 requesting confidential treatment for 
information it excluded from Exhibit 10.1 to Form 10-Q filed on May 7, 2009, as amended by reduced 
redactions from the same contract filed as Exhibit 10.1 to Form 10-Q/A filed on August 18, 2009.  
 
Based on representations by Dyax Corp. that this information qualifies as confidential 
commercial or financial information under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4), the 
Division of Corporation Finance has determined not to publicly disclose it. Accordingly, excluded 
information from the following exhibit(s) will not be released to the public for the time period(s) 
specified:  
 
Exhibit 10.1   through August 21, 2017 
 
For the Commission, by the Division of Corporation Finance, pursuant to delegated authority:  
 
Christian Windsor  
Special Counsel 
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Excerpted Portion of Exhibit 10.1 as originally filed on May 7, 2009 
 
 
 
Schedule 8.01(s)(i) 
  
[*****] 
  
  
Confidential materials omitted and filed separately with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Asterisks  
denote such omission. 
 
 
Excerpted Portion of Exhibit 10.1 as amended and filed with fewer redactions on 
August 18, 2009 
 
Schedule 8.01(s)(i)  
LFRP Joint Patents owned by Borrower 
  
AZ APPLICATIONS (ANTIBODIES) PROSECUTED BY AZ 
  
MATTER 
   
SERIAL 
 
PATENT 
 
PUBL 
 
TITLE 
 
STATUS 
 
ISSUE 
 
EXPIRATION 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-AR 
 
AR 
 
04 01 04408 
 
 
 
1890266A 
 
Antibodies 
 
ABANDONED 
 
 
 
9 /13/2008 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-AU 
 
AU 
 
2004293180 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
PENDING 
 
 
 
11/26/2024 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-BD 
 
BD 
 
277/2004 
 
1004419 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
ABANDONED 
 
8 /13/2006 
 
9 /13/2008 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-BR 
 
BR 
 
PI0417023-7 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
PENDING 
 
 
 
11/26/2024 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-CA 
 
CA 
 
PCT/EP04/013426 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
PENDING 
 
 
 
11/26/2024 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-CL 
 
CL 
 
2004-3047 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
ABANDONED 
 
 
 
9 /13/2008 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-CN 
 
CN 
 
200480035257.5 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
PENDING 
 
 
 
11/26/2024 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-CO 
 
CO 
 
06062058 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
ABANDONED 
 
 
 
9 /13/2008 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-EG 
 
EG 
 
493/200600 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
ABANDONED 
 
 
 
9 /13/2008 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-EP 
 
EP 
 
04819225.6 
 
 
 
EP1687336 
 
Antibodies 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
 
11/26/2024 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-GB 
 
GB 
 
0426043.6 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
PENDING 
 
 
 
11/26/2024 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-GC 
 
GC 
 
GCC/P/2004/4030 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
PENDING 
 
 
 
11/26/2020 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-ID 
 
ID 
 
W-00 2006 01433 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
ABANDONED 
 
 
 
9 /13/2008 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-IL 
 
IL 
 
175608 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
PENDING 
 
 
 
11/26/2024 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-IN 
 
IN 
 
3699 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
PENDING 
 
 
 
11/26/2024 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-JP 
 
JP 
 
2006-540392 
 
 
 
2008-502311 
 
Antibodies 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
 
11/26/2024 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-KR 
 
KR 
 
10-2006-7010370 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
PENDING 
 
 
 
11/26/2024 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-MT 
 
MT 
 
2503 
 
2503 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
ABANDONED 
 
6 /2 /2005 
 
9 /13/2008 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-MX 
 
MX 
 
PCT/EP04/013426 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
PENDING 
 
 
 
11/26/2024 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-MY 
 
MY 
 
PI 20044918 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
ABANDONED 
 
 
 
9 /13/2008 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-NO 
 
NO 
 
20063026 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
PENDING 
 
 
 
11/26/2024 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-NZ 
 
NZ 
 
PCT/EP04/013426 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
PENDING 
 
 
 
11/26/2024 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-PH 
 
PH 
 
PCT/EP04/013426 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
ABANDONED 
 
 
 
9 /13/2008 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-PK 
 
PK 
 
0948/04 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
ABANDONED 
 
 
 
9 /13/2008 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-RU 
 
RU 
 
2006122946 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
ABANDONED 
 
 
 
9 /13/2008 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-SG 
 
SG 
 
200603049-8 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
PENDING 
 
 
 
11/26/2024 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-TH 
 
TH 
 
095716 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
ABANDONED 
 
 
 
9 /13/2008 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-TW 
 
TW 
 
093136755 
 
 
 
200530267 
 
Antibodies 
 
ABANDONED 
 
 
 
9 /13/2008 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-UA 
 
UA 
 
200607109 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
ABANDONED 
 
 
 
9 /13/2008 
 
AZ-03-01-PRV 
 
US 
 
60/525,174 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
EXPIRED 
 
 
 
11/28/2004 
 
AZ-03-01-CIP-PCT-US 
 
US 
 
10/579,445 
 
 
 
 
 
Antibodies 
 
PENDING 
 
 
 
11/26/2024 
 
  
Confidential materials omitted and filed separately with the Secutities [sic] and Exchange 
Commission.  Asterisks denote such omission. 
Note:  Entirety of Schedule 8.01(s)(i) was redacted in original filing.   Only a portion of the first page of un-redacted Schedule 
8.01(s)(i) is shown above. 
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APPENDIX C 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Panel A:  Dependent Variables and CT Order Characteristics 
MONTHS_TO_APPROVALEquals the number of days elapsed between the SEC filing containing a CTR 
 request and CTR approval, divided by 30 and rounded up to the 
 nearest integer. 
PROTECTION_PERIOD  Equals the number of years elapsed between the SEC filing containing a CTR  
   request and the date through which the SEC agrees to exempt the firm from 
disclosure.   
SUCCESS   Equals an indicator variable equal to one if the CTR was approved without the  
   registrant amending their request or un-redacting information prior to approval 
 and equal to zero otherwise. 
EXHIBIT_COUNT  Equals the number of exhibits listed on the CT Order as containing redactions 
or the number of exhibits containing CTRs in a pending application. 
FORM_8K  Equals one if the registrant redacted information from an 8-K or 6-K filing and 
equals zero otherwise. 
FOREIGN_FILER  Equals one for Form 20-F or 6-K filers, and equals zero otherwise.  
 
Panel B: SOX 408 Criteria 
PE_RATIO   Equals the price to earnings ratio as of the 2007 balance sheet date. 
HIGH_MVE  Equals one if the firm is in the highest decile of market value of all firms in 
Compustat as of the 2007 balance sheet date. 
HIGH_VOLATILITY  Equals one if the firm beta over (-300, -45) prior to the CTR request is greater 
than 1.5 and equal to zero otherwise. 
 
Panel C: Proprietary Costs 
RD    Equals total research and development expense divided by total assets. 
LOG_FIRMS   Equals the natural log of the number of firms operating in the registrant’s 
NAICS code in as reported by the U.S. Census Department’s 2007 Economic 
Census. 
SEGMENTS  Equals the natural log of the number of operating segments in 2007 per 
Compustat. 
IND_RD  Equals industry mean research and development expense in 2007 divided by 
total assets for Compustat firms by 2-digit SIC code. 
IND_CAPX  Equals industry mean capital expenditures in 2007 divided by total assets for 
Compustat firms by 2-digit SIC code. 
IND_ROA   Equals industry mean ROA in 2007 for Compustat firms by 2-digit SIC code. 
 
Panel D: Red Flags 
RESTATEMENT   Equals one if the firm reported a financial restatement between 2004 
and 2007 and equal to zero otherwise.   
ICMW  Equals one if the firm reported a Section 404 material weakness between 2004 
and 2007 and equal to zero otherwise. 
SEC_INVESTIG   Equals one if the SEC investigated the firm for a restatement announced 
 between 2001 and 2008 per Audit Analytics and equals zero otherwise. 
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Panel E: Firm Characteristics 
All firm characteristics are measured as of the fiscal quarter coinciding with the redaction if filed on a 
periodic filing (10-Q, 10-K, or similar) or measured as the most recent quarter if filed on an 8-K or 6-K. 
 
LOG_ASSETS   Equals the natural log of total assets. 
ROA    Equals net income before extraordinary item divided by total assets. 
DEBT_RATIO   Equals total short term debt plus total long term debt divided by total 
 assets. 
BIGN  Equals to one if the firm was audited by a Big 4 firm in 2008 and equal to zero 
otherwise. 
NEG_CF   Equals one if the firm reported negative operating cash flows and equals zero 
 otherwise. 
FOLLOWING  Equals one if at least one analyst covers the firm in 2007 per I/B/E/S and equals 
zero otherwise. 
 
Panel F: Additional Selection Model Variables 
All selection model variables are measured using annual 2007 data 
 
 
REDACT Equals one if the firm received approval for a CTR during the full sample 
period (5/1/08-11/30/09) and equals zero otherwise. 
EQUITY_ISSUE  Equals one if the firm issued equity during 2008 per SDC and equals zero 
otherwise. 
DEBT_ISSUE  Equals one if the firm increased total debt during 2007 per Compustat and 
equals zero otherwise. 
#CONTRACTS  Equals the number of Exhibit 10.x filed by the firm during 2007 based on text 
 search of EDGAR metadata headers.   
FOREIGN_OP   Equals one if the firm reported foreign income and equals zero otherwise. 
PENSION Equals one if the firm reported pension assets or liabilities in Compustat and 
equals zero otherwise. 
DIVIDENDS   Equals one if the firm paid dividends during the year and equals zero 
 otherwise. 
INTANGIBLES   Equals net intangibles divided by total assets. 
#FOLLOWING  Equals the number of analysts issuing forecasts for the firm in 2007 per I/B/E/S 
and equals zero otherwise. 
H-INDEX SIC2  Equals a Hirfindahl Index of industry concentration by two-digit SIC code for 
all firms in Compustat calculated as the sum of the squared market share (firm 
total revenue/industry total revenue). 
H_INDEX NAICS  Equals a Hirfindahl Index of industry concentration by NAICS code for all 
firms in Compustat calculated as the sum of the squared market share (firm 
total revenue/industry total revenue).  
%FIRMS Equals the number of firms in an NAICS in 2007 per Compustat divided by the 
number of firms in an NAICS per the 2007 economic census. 
 
Panel G: Other Variables 
 
DISC_ACCR  Equals the residual from the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) with 
additional terms for ROA (Kothari et al. 2005) and an indicator variable for 
negative operating cash flows  (Ball and Shivakumar 2006). Discretionary 
accruals are measured as of the 10-K coinciding with the CTR or the 10-K 
preceding the CTR if filed on a quarterly or timely report. 
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ABS_DISC_ACCR Equals the absolute value of DISC_ACCR. 
UNEXPECTED_FEES  Calculated following Hribar et al. 2009 as of the 10-K coinciding with the CTR 
or the 10-K preceding the CTR if filed on a quarterly or timely report.   
CONNECTED   Equals one if the firm made PAC contributions to Congress during the 2006 
election cycle and equal to zero otherwise as reported by the Federal Election 
Commission. 
MOST_ADMIRED  Equals one if the firm was listed on the Fortune Most Admired Firm list in 
2007.  
CIG  Equals one if the firm issued management earnings forecasts during 2007 as 
reported in First Call and equals zero otherwise.   
INITIATAE_CIG Equals one if the firm did not issue management earnings forecasts during 2007 
but issued management earnings forecasts in 2008, and equals zero otherwise. 
DISCONTINUE_CIG Equals one if the firm issued management earnings forecasts in 2007 but did 
not issue management earnings forecasts in 2008, and equals zero otherwise. 
%POINT Equals the percentage of management earnings forecasts that are classified by 
First Call as “point” forecasts. 
WELLS Equals one if the firm disclosed receipt of a Wells Notice in 2008 and equals 
zero otherwise.  
302 ICMW  Equals one if the firm reported a material weakness under Section 302 of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act and equal to zero otherwise.   
COMMENT_DURATION  Equals the natural log of the mean days between the initiation and resolution of 
SEC comment letters sent to the firm between 2006 and 2010.   
#COMMENT Equals the natural log of the number of comment letters conversations initiated 
by the SEC to the firm between 2006 and 2010. 
COMMENT  Equal to one if the firm was under comment letter review at the time the CTR 
was requested. 
GOING CONCERN  Equals one if the firm received a going concern opinion in the year prior to or 
year coinciding with the CTR (if filed on an annual report).   
MERGER  Equals to one if the firm interested in a merger or acquisition during the year in 
which the CTR was requested, and equals zero otherwise. 
FIRM _AGE  Equals the number of years in which the firm has data available in CRSP as of 
the year prior to the CTR request.  
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